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ANNUAL SURVEY OF ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
1977-1978
DANIEL A. CARRELL*
The law, in all vicissitudes of government, fluctuations of the pas-
sions, or flights of enthusiasm, will preserve a steady urideviating
course; it will not bend to the uncertain wishes, imaginations and
wanton tempers of men.-John Adams'
The year 1978 produced no real surprises in antitrust, either at the
Supreme Court or elsewhere-with the possible exception of publication
of the FTC's new premerger notification rules. Producing no Illinois Brick3
or GTE Sylvania,4 the Supreme Court preserved a steady course by build-
ing on and extending antitrust case law. In spite of a flurry of legislative
activity, at times displaying fluctuating passions and "flights of enthusi-
asm," only airline deregulation was enacted. Antitrust enforcement was
further marked by continued public focus on the Justice Department's
Antitrust Division and by meetings of the National Commission for the
Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S STEADY COURSE
A. Introduction
If measured by volume, the Supreme Court had one of its most active
years in antitrust. No fewer than seven antitrust cases during the 1977-78
term yielded full opinions, addressing diverse subject matter ranging from
chickens to Greyhound buses. Through these cases, the Court evidenced
further hostility toward antitrust immunities, underscored its focus on
economic impact, treated the interplay between the Sherman Act and the
* Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; A.B. (1963) Davidson College; B.A., M.A.
(1965, 1969) Oxford University; J.D. (1968) Stanford University.
I THE TRIAL OF'THE BRITISH SOLDIERS 117 (1824) (transcript of 1770 trial of soldiers
accused of Boston Massacre).
2 This article reviews United States Supreme Court antitrust decisions during the 1977-
78 term and surveys other major federal antitrust developments in 1978, including one case
from the Court's current term.
3 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), overruling United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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Robinson-Patman Act while examining the ingredients of criminal intent,
and clarified antitrust procedure. Two decisions concerning class action
procedure will undoubtedly affect antitrust litigation, and various cases
outside antitrust had competitive ramifications.
The Court continued its fascination with antitrust immunities by de-
ciding four cases during the 1977-1978 term in which defendants asserted
an immunity from the antitrust laws. In each case the Court upheld a court
of appeals decision against the asserted immunity. In another case from
the current term, however, the Court accepted a claimed immunity.
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States5 delivered a
coup de grace to the so-called "learned professions" immunity while illu-
minating the rule of reason. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co. I held that municipalities are not automatically immune from the anti-
trust laws under the state action doctrine. National Broiler Marketing
Association v. United States7 held that a cooperative organization that
included chicken processors is not exempt from liability under the Sher-
man Act by virtue of the Capper-Volstead Act because processors are not
"farmers." And St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry interpreted
the term "boycott," as used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, as broad
enough to encompass a refusal by certain insurers to deal with the policy-
holders of another, thus subjecting the insurers to the Sherman Act. In the
most recent case, New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W Fox Co.,9 the
Court upheld invocation of the state action doctrine to protect implemen-
tation of the California Automobile Franchise Act.
With criminal antitrust enforcement intensifying in the wake of in-
creased antitrust penalties, 0 United States v. United States Gypsum Co."
may be the most significant case of the term. In Gypsum, the Court ana-
lyzed the elements of criminal antitrust liability, while confirming that
verification of prices by communicating with competitors to establish a
"meeting competition" defense under the Robinson-Patman Act does not
preclude conviction for price fixing under the Sherman Act.
The Court decided several procedural cases affecting antitrust litiga-
tion. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,"2 one of three cases in which
the Court wrestled with the meaning of a single statutory term, 3 the Court
435 U.S. 679 (1978); see text accompanying notes 21-52 infra.
435 U.S. 389 (1978); see text accompanying notes 57-102 infra.
436 U.S. 816 (1978); see text accompanying notes 144-53 infra.
98 S. Ct. 2923 (1978); see text accompanying notes 123-43 infra.
99 S. Ct. 403 (1978); see text accompanying notes 103-11 infra.
' The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974),
amended the Sherman Act to provide that violations constitute felonies rather than misde-
meanors, the criminal penalty instituted in 1890. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976). Maximum fines
were also increased. Id.
" 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978); see text accompanying notes 170-224 infra.
Ii 434 U.S. 308 (1978); see text accompanying notes 225-41 infra.
" The other cases were National Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 463 U.S. 816
(1978), examining the meaning of "farmers," and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry,
98 S. Ct. 2923 (1978), considering the scope of "boycott."
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held that foreign governments were "persons" under section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act and thus entitled to bring treble damage actions for alleged anti-
trust violations." Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc.'5 held that
government intervention in an interstate commerce proceeding does not
toll the statute of limitations for private antitrust actions" because such
intervention is not institution of antitrust enforcement under section 5(1)
of the Clayton Act." Two additional cases focused on class actions. In
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay's the Court sounded the death knell for the
"death knell doctrine" by ruling that denial of class certification is not an
appealable "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 even though named
plaintiffs might be induced to abandon their claims. In Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders'9 the Court narrowed the range of circumstances in
which a trial court may order a defendant to cover the cost of class action
notice.
Several other decisions are likely to generate significant competitive
impact. From an antitrust standpoint, the most important of these cases
was Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,"0 in which the Court upheld a
Maryland statute prohibiting oil producers from operating gas stations in
the state.
B. Immunities
1. Engineers: Immunity in Light of the Rule of Reason
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States" provides
a useful springboard for examining antitrust cases being reviewed, for in
Engineers the .Court expounded on the rule of reason-the fundamental
standard underlying application of the Sherman Act. In examining the
contours of the rule of reason, the Court evidenced a restrictive attitude
1 The term "person" was also examined in an antitrust setting in City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), with respect to jurisdiction over a munici-
pality in a treble damage action. Id. at 394-97.
" 98 S. Ct. 2370 (1978); see text accompanying notes 242-52 infra.
" Section 4(b) of the Clayton Act provides a four-year statute of limitations for private
antitrust actions. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1976).
" 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1976).
" 98 S. Ct. 2454 (1978); see text accompanying notes 253-58 infra.
" 98 S. Ct. 2380 (1978); see text accompanying notes 259-68 infra.
437 U.S. 117 (1978). Other such cases include FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (upholding an FCC regulation prohibiting future formation
of newspaper-broadcasting combinations in the same community) and Zenith Radio Corp.
v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978) (holding that Japan's remission of commodity taxes
on exports does not give rise to required levies under the Tariff Act of 1930 upon importation
of products into the United States). Even cases such as In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978)
and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), which considered restrictions
against solicitation by lawyers in the face of first amendment challenges, will impact on
competition. While in Primus the Court rejected application of South Carolina's solicitation
rules to a letter advising of legal assistance available from the ACLU, in Ohralik the Court
upheld application of Ohio's rules against solicitation in circumstances "likely to pose dan-
gers that the State has a right to prevent." 436 U.S. at 449.
21 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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toward immunities by confirming the nonexistence of the "learned profes-
sions" immunity.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar," the Court had rejected the argu-
ment that Congress had intended a "sweeping exclusion" for the learned
professions from the phrase "trade or commerce" in section 1 of the Sher-
man Act." Although holding that minimum fee schedules published by the
Fairfax County Bar Association constituted price fixing, the Court recog-
nized that conduct by a profession should not necessarily be scrutinized
in the same light as conduct by a conventional business.
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distin-
guished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining
whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as inter-
changeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could
properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other
situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
24
The Goldfarb Court's special consideration of professional conduct in
footnote 17 is not couched in terms of immunity. Although it is arguable
that conduct otherwise constituting a per se violation of the antitrust laws
may be brought under the rule of reason if carried on by a profession,n the
holding in Goldfarb, coupled with the words of the footnote, most likely
means that professional conduct is simply one factor to be taken into
account in a rule of reason analysis. One would have expected such an
analysis to include this factor even without Goldfarb. Nevertheless, prior
to Engineers, the Justice Department had regarded Goldfarb as making
"clear that no such exemption now exists, and the 'learned professions' are
fully subject to the antitrust laws. 28 Goldfarb and Engineers together
confirm that while there has never been a "learned professions" immunity
as such, the fact that challenged conduct is the practice of a profession is
relevant for the purpose of applying the rule of reason.
2 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
2 Id. at 788. The Association's argument was based on dicta in cases such as FTC v.
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931), in which the Court said that "medical practitioners
. . . follow a profession and not a trade. See 421 U.S. at 786 n.15.
24 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17.
See, e.g., Miles, Competition and Professional Codes of Ethics, in IV VA. B.A.J. 15,
19 (Fall, 1978). Of course, it should be borne in mind that the per se doctrine is merely a
corollary of the rule of reason.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report of the Task Force on Antitrust Immunities 42 (1977)
(emphasis added). "Learned Professions" warranted a separate section in this report. Consis-
tent with the conclusion quoted in the text above, the Briefing Paper on Antitrust Immuni-
ties, prepared by the Antitrust Division staff supporting the National Commission for the
Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, failed to mention "learned professions."
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The National Society of Professional Engineers relied on footnote 17 in
defending a canon of its code of ethics which prohibited competitive bid-
ding by members of the SocietyY The Court's conclusion was foregone
because of the sweeping nature of the prohibition imposed by the canon.
As Mr. Justice Stevens noted for the majority, the Society's arguments
amounted to "nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the
Sherman Act." However, Engineers afforded an opportunity for analyti-
cal advance through reexamination of the rule of reason.
Section 11 of the Society's Code of Ethics prohibited members from
competing "unfairly" by soliciting or submitting "engineering proposals on
the basis of competitive bidding. ' 2 The district court had found that the
Society's Board of Ethical Review had "uniformly interpreted the defen-
dant's ethical rules against competitive bidding for engineering services as
prohibiting the submission of any form of price information to a prospec-
tive customer which would enable that customer to make a price compari-
son on engineering services."3 Thus, engineers were to be selected solely
on the basis of education, reputation, and other such criteria, without
regard to price. Even though the client, once having retained an engineer,
could withdraw his selection if negotiations for a fee arrangement proved
unsuccessful, a forced series of negotiations with different engineers would
increase costs and delay progress on projects. Price competition inevitably
would be chimerical. Although the practice was "not price fixing as such,
no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompeti-
tive character of such an agreement."'3 In sum, the practice was held to
be a per se violation of the Sherman Act.32 The injunction issued by the
district court against the conduct was upheld.-
The Society had contended that the practice was "reasonable" since
price competition among professional engineers would be contrary to the
public interest. It would cause engineers to bid low with a view toward
taking economic shortcuts that would adversely affect the quality oftheir
work. The public health, safety, and welfare would therefore be endan-
gered, the Society asserted: Competition, in such circumstances, would
itself be unreasonable and thus in opposition to the rule of reason. 3
435 U.S. at 687.
Id. at 695.
21 Id. at 683 n.3.
3* United States v. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193, 1206 (D.D.C. 1974).
The district court enjoined enforcement of the relevant ethical rules. Id. at 1216. On direct
appeal to the Supreme Court, the injunction was vacated, and the case was remanded for
consideration in light of Goldfarb. 422 U.S. 1031 (1975). The district court adhered to its
initial decision. 404 F. Supp. 461 (D.D.C. 1975). The Court of Appeals affirmed, but with
instructions for the district court to modify its decree in parts so as not to require affirmative
statements by the Society that competitive bidding is not unethical. 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
1, 435 U.S. at 692.
'" See id. at 696.
Id. at 699.
3 Id. at 684-85.
1979]
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The Society's position found no support in Goldfarb's footnote 17. As
the Court explained, the purpose of a rule of reason analysis is:
to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the re-
straint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is
in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an
industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy de-
cision has been made by the Congress.35
The Court did not assert that noneconomic considerations-such as
public health, welfare, and safety-are improper in a rule of reason analy-
sis. But these considerations are not to obscure a focus on competition. As
the government explained, the engineering canon amounted to overkill.
"The ban applies no matter how simple and repetitive the work, how
expert the purchaser, or how thoroughly the engineer has been able to
study the project before quoting a price."36 In spite of Society assertions of
"a relationship between inadequate or negligent engineering work and the
awarding of such work by bidding or fee cutting,""7 competition was not
to be overthrown as the ruling criterion in applying the rule of reason. The
Court recognized that elimination of the canon would not necessarily lead
to choice of engineers solely on the basis of price; and that even when it
did, it would not inevitably lead to negligent work." The risk to safety was
not sufficient to permit the Court to contradict congressional policy in
favor of competition.
One could easily conclude that it is not the proper task of a court to
determine whether in given circumstances there is another public policy
that transcends competition in importance. Dicta in the majority opinion,
however, suggest an excessive and unjustifiable emphasis on competition.
In briefly describing the history of the rule of reason, Justice Stevens
concluded:
From Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court in Chicago Board
of Trade to the Court opinion written by Mr. Justice Powell in
Continental T. V., Inc., the Court has'adhered to the position that
the inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the chal-
lenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that
suppresses competition. "The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition.""
The Court recognized that professional "[e]thical norms may serve to
regulate and promote this competition, and thus fall within the Rule of
- Id. at 692.
uBrief for United States at 39.
1 Brief for Petitioner at 28.
435 U.S. at 694.
3Id.
"* 435 U.S. at 691 (emphasis added; quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
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Reason,"" but the norm of engineering canon 11 was antithetical to compe-
tition and fell outside the rule.
The Court's reliance on Chicago Board of Trade is unfortunate. Not
only is it questionable whether the trade rule in that case actually pro-
moted competition, but the suggestion that promotion of competition tra-
ditionally has been the test of the rule of reason is suspect. The Court
might well have replaced the statement of Justice Brandeis with Justice
Powell's succinct statement of the rule, which was relegated to a footnote:
"Under this rule, the fact-finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case
in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing
an Unreasonable restraint on competition.
'42
The difference between the statements of Justices Brandeis and Powell
is significant, for a rule of reason analysis is applied only to restraints to
determine whether they are unreasonable. The question of reasonableness
presupposes a restraint that adversely affects competition, not one that
promotes it. As Professor Sullivan has pointed out, traditional enforcement
of the Sherman Act "identifies impact on competition as the sole variable
to be measured in applying the rule." 3 Consequently, "this tradition reads
the rule of reason as condemning every contract, combination or conspir-
acy which in purpose or likely effect will significantly restrict competi-
tion." Conduct ultimately promoting competition entails no application
of the rule at all.
Justice Blackmun refrained from joining Part II of the Court's opinion
because of a fear that the majority decision left no room for ethical rules
with "overall anticompetitive effect." 5 By "holding that ethical norms can
pass muster under the Rule of Reason only if they promote competition, I
am not at all certain that the Court leaves enough room for realistic appli-
cation of the Sherman Act to professional services."' 4' Indeed, if promotion
of competition is the sole test, the Court has cast aside footnote 17 and the
rule of reason altogether and is subjecting professions to a more severe
Sherman Act test than ordinary businesses.
The Court surely intendedl no such consequence. By drawing on Mitchel
v. Reynolds4 to support its holding that economic competition is not to be
displaced by competing public policies as the measure of conduct under
" 435 U.S. at 696 (emphasis added).
aId. at 691 n.17 (emphasis added; quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)). Justice Powell did footnote the Chicago Board of Trade quotation.
433 U.S. at 49 n.15.
13 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF Tm LAW OF ANTrRusT 186 (1977) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN]. An excellent treatment of the history of the rule of reason is
set forth at 165-97. Id. See also H. THORELI, THE FEDERAL ANTTRUST PoLcY 9-53 (1954).
" SULLIVAN, supra note 43, at 187.
4 435 U.S. at 699 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist joined the concurring
opinion. The Chief Justice dissented in part, challenging under the first amendment a portion
of the injunction that prohibited the Society from making any statement that competitive
bidding is unethical. Id. at 701. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration of the case.
" Id. at 701 (emphasis added).
" 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
1979]
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the Sherman Act, the Court implied it was not manufacturing new clo-
thing for the rule of reason. Mitchel had upheld a covenant not to compete
that was ancillary to the sale of a bakery business. Enhancement of the
marketability of the business was reasonable in light of only a "temporary
and limited loss of competition."4 Moreover, as noted above, the Court in
Engineers quoted Justice Powell's formulation of the rule of reason, and it
cited favorably a 1955 government report explaining that the rule of reason
examined whether the challenged conduct "constitutes an undue restraint
of competitive conditions .... ,,4 These are not sources for a promotion
of competition test.
The Court's purpose in Engineers was to eliminate the proposition that
the rule of reason considers whether competition in given circumstances is
itself reasonable. In summarizing the historical course of the rule, the
Court borrowed language from Chicago Board of Trade, a case outside the
mainstream of that course." Nevertheless, even in Chicago Board of Trade,
the Court's references to "regulation" and to "suppress or destroy competi-
tion" may signify only that anticompetitive effects can at times be offset
by procompetitive effects and that what is of consequence is whether ulti-
mately there is a significant adverse impact on competition.5' In light of
the precise issue before the Court in Engineers, then, the liberties the
Court may have taken in describing the rule of reason should not be treated
as a reformulation of the rule itself."
' 435 U.S. at 689 (footnote omitted).
5 Report of Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 11
(1955) (emphasis added), quoted at 435 U.S. 691 n.16.
See generally SuLLvrAN, supra note 43, at 175-79 (discussing Chicago Board of Trade).
5' The Court in Engineers recognized that irrespective of the actual competitive impact
of a rule (the "Call Rule") in Chicago Board of Trade regulating the price of certain bids after
normal operating hours of the Chicago grain exchange, the Court in Chicago Board of Trade
determined that the Call Rule had positive effects on competition. 435 U.S. at 693 n.19. Thus,
the statement there of the rule of reason fits the facts of that case as the Court understood
them, and it was unnecessary to determine whether the rule of reason needed to be more
expansive.
52 See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 1978-2 TR na CAS. 62,338, at 67,039 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
The issue raised in Engineers had been confronted early in the interpretation of the Sherman
Act in a case that helped formulate the first generation of the rule of reason. In United States
v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898), the Court rejected the contention that elimination
of "ruinous competition" through cartel-imposed railroad freight rates would ultimately pro-
mote rather than restrain trade:
An agreement of the nature of this one, which directly and effectually stifles compe-
tition, must be regarded under the statute as one in restraint of trade, notwith-
standing there are possibilities that a restraint of trade may also follow competition
that may be indulged in until the weaker [rail]roads are completely destroyed and
the survivor thereafter raises rates and maintains them.
Id. at 577. Joint Traffic recognized that a restraint of trade and a restraint of competition
are not necessarily the same. For example, unilateral refusal by a seller to deal with a
particular buyer restrains trade between the two but does not affect the buyer's ability to
compete, assuming alternative sources of supply. On the other hand, competitors forming a
joint venture eliminate competition between themselves but may well increase their collective
trade with others. The distinction has become blurred through the years, however, because
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2. City of Lafayette and Orrin Fox: The Maturing-of State Action
Engineers illustrates the role of federal antitrust laws in prohibiting the
displacement of competition by private entities. State economic regula-
tion, however, has inhibited competition in varying circumstances from a
time well before passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. The principles of
federalism dictate that this regulation be preserved, at least to a substan-
tial degree. The Supreme Court has responded accordingly. Through impo-
sition of the doctrine of "state action," it has recognized permissible re-
straints placed on competition by stateq.
The term "state action" is a judicially created child of the 1940's that
traces its roots to Parker v. Browns and beyond. 4 Only in recent years,
however, has the doctrine begun to mature. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co." and New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co."
were the fourth and fifth Supreme Court cases in the past four years
involving circumstances in which "state action" might be said to have
been taken. In spite of this recent scrutiny, the Court has failed to place
the boundaries of state action in sharp focus. Development of the doctrine
has been hindered by unnecessary and misleading attention to whether
those seeking immunity are governmental or private in nature.
Lafayette's five opinions initially addressed the narrow question of
whether conduct by municipalities is entitled automatically to state action
immunity. In responding negatively, a plurality of the Court offered guide-
lines as to when the immunity would be available to municipalities. Five
opinions in one case hardly can be expectd to clarify rules of conduct.
Nevertheless, viewed in its historical context, Lafayette, coupled with the
virtually unanimous decision in Orrin Fox, adds meaning to the term
"state action" generally-not just in its application to municipalities or
other governmental entities.
a. City of Lafayette
This case presented a counterclaim brought by the power company
against two Louisiana cities, both of which had alleged various restraints
of trade on the part of the company. The counterclaim asserted several
forms of anticompetitive behavior by the cities, including an alleged con-
spiracy to require customers of the company to purchase electricity from
the cities as a condition for obtaining continued water and gas service. 5
The district court had granted a motion by the cities to dismiss the coun-
terclaim on the ground that the federal antitrust laws were made in-
antitrust addresses only restraints adversely affecting competition. See Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
3 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
Olsen V. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904); Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
"435 U.S. 389 (1978).
99 S. Ct. 403 (1978).
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 392 n.6 (1978).
1975-1 TRADE CAS. 60,240 (E.D. La. 1975).
1979]
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applicable to them by Parker, as interpreted in Saenz v. University Inter-
scholastic League." The Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that con-
duct by cities is not "automatically outside the scope of the federal anti-
trust laws." 0 In determining when municipal conduct is outside that
scope, the court of appeals explained:
[A] district court must ask whether the state legislature contem-
plated a certain type of anticompetitive restraint. In our opinion,
though, it is not necessary to point to an express statutory mandate
for each act which is alleged to violate the antitrust laws. It will
suffice if the challenged activity was clearly within the legislative
intent."
The Supreme Court affirmed both the decision and analysis of the court
of appeals. After rejecting the cities' arguments that Congress never in-
tended the Sherman Act to apply to municipalities, and other contentions
apart from the state actin doctrine that might justify immunity, the plu-
rality 2 turned to the doctrine itself. Goldbarb had "made it clear," the
plurality said, "that, for purposes of the Parker doctrine, not every act of
a state agency is that of the State as sovereign."" Thus, cities being subor-
dinate to states, are not automatically immune under the state action
doctrine. The question remained, however, as to when cities can success-
fully claim immunity, a question best resolved in its historical setting,
beginning with Parker.
In Parker, suit had been brought against state officials and private
parties acting under color of state law to enjoin enforcement of a market-
ing program contemplated by a California statute. The program restricted
competition among grape growers and regulated prices in the distribution
of raisins to packers." Both the impetus and the final approval for the
program came from the producers who were regulated by the program, and
who, through a committee, administered it."
" 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973). The Fifth Circiit held in Saenz that a state agency and
state official were "outside the ambit of the Sherman Act." Id. at 1028.
" 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976).
' Id.
62 Justice Brennan authored the plurality opinion, in which Justices Marshall, Powell,
and Stevens joined. Justice Marshall also filed a concurring opinion. The Chief Justice
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices White
and Rehnquist and in part by Justice Blackmun, dissented. Justice Blackmun filed a separate
dissent.
6 435 U.S. at 410.
" Suit was originally brought on the ground that enforcement of the program interfered
with the plaintiff's right to engage in interstate commerce. The Court on its own motion raised
the question whether the state statute was rendered invalid by the Sherman Act. The precise
issue, then, was whether California law was preempted. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579, 586.89 (1976); id. at 618 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
" Under the statute, ten producers of an agricultural commodity could petition an advi-
sory commission, comprised of the Director of Agriculture and other members appointed by
the Governor for the establishment of & marketing program. After a public hearing, and an
appropriate finding by the commission, the Director was required to select a program commit-
tee from nominees chosen by the producers. The committee was to formulate the program
[Vol. XXXVI
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The Supreme Court assumed that the program'would have violated the
Sherman Act if it had been organized and made effective solely by a
combination of private persons."6 However, the California program had
derived its authority from the comman& of the state legislature. The Court
explained that while a state cannot provide immunity simply by authoriz-
ing violations of the Sherman Act, California had adopted as state policy
an anticompetitive program and had prescribed the conditions of its opera-
tion, including proposal and approval of this program by producers." The
state, "as sovereign, [had] imposed. . . as an act of government" a type
of restraint that the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit. 8 In view
of the words and history of that Act, the Court held that the Act must be
taken as "a prohibition of individual and not state action." 9 The reason
was apparent. "In a dual system of government in which, under the Consti-
tution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's
control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Con-
gress."70
Eight years after Parker, the Court confirmed its admonition that a
state may not simply legalize private conduct that is prohibited by the
Sherman Act. In Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,71 the
Court invalidated a Louisiana fair trade statute passed in response to the
Miller-Tydings amendment to section 1 of the Sherman Act, permitting
the fixing of minimum resale prices if authorized by state law. The state
statute was held deficient in that it purported to cover retailers who were
not signatories to resale price contracts. Once any retailer had signed such
a contract, the others were bound. The Court's holding was based on its
interpretation of Miller-Tydings, but when read in conjunction with
Parker, Schwegmann suggests that "state action" at least necessitates
comprehensive state regulation-not merely an attempt to legalize con-
duct illegal under federal law. Nor is it enough for the private conduct
simply to arise in a regulatory setting. Thus, in Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.," the Court rejected a Parker defense to
monopolistic and discriminatory conduct, allegedly engaged in through a
corporate purchasing agent of the Canadian government, but which was
not "approved" or "compelled" by government officials or Canadian law.
Nothing in Parker, Schwegmann, or Continental Ore suggested that
governmental entities automatically are immune from Sherman Act liabil-
for approval, modification, or rejection by the commission after another public hearing. If a
given percentage of the producers then approved the program, the Director was to declare it
instituted under committee administration. 317 U.S. at 344-47.
" Id. at 350.




341 U.S. 384 (1951).
370 U.S. 690, 706.07 (1962).
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ity, nor was there any indication that a purely private party 3 automati-
cally is beyond state action protection. Subsequent lower court decisions
reenforced the notion that the doctrine rested not on whose conduct was
under review, but on what authority gave rise to it.74 As the Fourth Circuit
concluded in 1959, "When a state has a public policy against free competi-
tion in an industry important to it, the state may regulate that industry
in order to control, or, in a proper case, to eliminate competition therein.
'7
The crucial question is "whether the real decision makers were public
officials or private businessmen." 6 Cases concerning the pervasive regula-
tion of natural monopolies, such as public utilities, illustrated circumstan-
ces in which such a question could be answered so as to afford immunity."
In 1975, the Supreme Court reexamined the state action doctrine for
the first time since Parker v. Brown. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,78
first of the five state action cases of the 1970's to reach the Supreme Court,
the facts made extended analysis of the doctrine unnecessary. Neverthe-
less, a unanimous Court,7 9 in applying antitrust laws to the legal profession
for the first time, held that state agencies are not necessarily entitled to
the state action shelter.
The Court rejected the arguments of the Virginia State Bar that by
enforcing a county bar association's minimum fee schedules it was merely
implementing ethical rules promulgated by the Virginia Supreme Court
and that, as the agency authorized to enforce these rules, it was entitled
" The producer defendants in Parker were members of the program committee charged
by statute with administering the marketing program. 317 U.S. at 344.
1' For example, in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d
25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970), relating to the adoption of defendant's specifi-
cations for purposes of competitive bidding on public swimming pool accessory equipment,
the court rejected "the facile conclusion that action by any public official automatically
confers exemption," and held that "valid government action confers antitrust immunity only
when government determines that competition is not the summum bonum in a particular
field and deliberately attempts to provide an alternate form of public regulation." Id. at 30.
Similarly, in Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v..Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), concerning regulation by a Texas agency
of natural gas extraction, the court recognized that action by a state "only begins the analysis,
for it is not every governmental act that points a path to an antitrust shelter." 438 F.2d at
1294.
11 Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 1959). The
court continued by explaining that persons subject to state control may participate in the
regulation so long as they are "adequately supervised by independent state officials." Id.
However, protected action "must be state action, not individual action masquerading as state
action." Id.
1' Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1295
(5th Cir. 1971) (quoting George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d
25, 33 n.8 (1st Cir. 1970)).
" E.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248
(4th Cir. 1971).
79 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
11 The decision was unanimous. Justice Powell took no part in the decision. Justice
Douglas has since been replaced by Justice Stevens. The other seven Justices, along with
Justices Powell and Stevens, produced the opinions in City of Lafayette and Orrin Fox.
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to immunity. The Court also rejected the local association's attempt to
ride the coattails of the state bar by arguing that issuance of fee schedules
had been "prompted" by the bar. The Court recognized that there was no
statute directing members of the bar to establish minimum fee schedules
and no indication that the Virginia Supreme Court approved of the state
bar's ethical opinions on this subject. The state bar, by enforcing the use
of county minimum fee schedules through disciplinary sanctions, had
"voluntarily joined in what [was] essentially a private anticompetitive
activity." 0 Parker provided no defense, for the defendants had failed to
meet the "threshold" requirement said to have been established by Parker.
The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive act
is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to
proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State acting as
sovereign. . . . It is not enough that. . . anticompetitive conduct
is promoted by state action; rather anticompetitive activities must
be compelled by direction of the State acting as sovereign." 8' 1
The words "required" and "compelled" were ill-chosen, for they imply
that the conduct in question must itself be required by the state, without
any choice on the part of the regulated party. In light of Parker and
Continental Ore, both of which were cited in Goldbarb as support for the
compulsion standard, these terms should not be read literally. The market-
ing program in Parker could not have come into being without private
initiative and approval. Continental Ore suggested that governmental
"approval" of conduct would be sufficient. The difference between Parker,
in which conduct was protected, and Continental Ore, in which it was not,
is that in Parker the challenged conduct was contemplated by a regulatory
scheme.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,82 decided one year after Goldfarb, repre-
sented a digression in the development of the state action doctrine. For the
first time the Court considered a claim to state action immunity by a
purely private party-one not participating in the administration of a state
program. In Cantor, the Court held that an ifivestor-owned utility, which
supplied customers with free light bulbs and incorporated within its rate
structure the cost of doing so, was not protected by the state action doc-
trine even though the bulb distribution program had become a mandatory
service upon adoption of the utility's tariff by the Michigan Public Service
Commission. The confusing and unorthodox plurality opinion presented
the novel view that Parker applies only to actions against state officials
who act pursuant to express legislative command. The Court glossed over
the act that the producer members of the agricultural marketing program
committee were among the defendants in Parker .3
421 U.S. at 792.
"Id.
428 U:S. 579 (1976).
Justice Stevens delivered the Court's opinion, joined in whole by Justices Brennan,
White and Marshall and in substantial part by Chief Justice Burger. The Chief Justice
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Five Justices joined in suggesting a two-pronged state action test for
private defendants: whether the defendant had merely obeyed a state com-
mand and whether Congress had intended to have antitrust standards
applied in the circumstances of state regulation.' In Cantor the Court
could have found that the threshold standard of Goldfarb had been met
since the utility was required to continue its bulb distribution program
until further modification of its rate schedule. Nevertheless, the Court held
that since neither of the two parts of the suggested test had been satisfied
there had been no state action.
It is unnecessary for present purposes to explore the murky depths of
Cantor's twofold test." As the plurality noted in City of Lafayette, Cantor's
analysis is not "necessarily applicable" in examining conduct by state
subdivisions. 6 What should be recognized is that a conventional state
action analysis (without a new test because of a private defendant) could
have produced the same result in Cantor. As the Court there pointed out,
light bulb distribution was unregulated. Neither theMichigan legislature
nor the Public Service Commission had ever specifically investigated the
desirability of the distribution program or its possible anticompetitive ef-
fect on the relevant market." The underlying justification for state action
immunity is state regulation of conduct in furtherance of state policy. The
absence of such regulation and policy concerning the distribution of light-
bulbs dictated the results in Cantor.
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,s the Court returned to unanimity. In
Bates, the Court rejected an antitrust challenge to Arizona's ban on lawyer
advertising, finding that the state bar was immune from liability.89 The
Court observed that the challenged restraint was the affirmative command
of the Arizona Supreme Court, which was the real party in interest since
the role of the state bar was completely defined by that court. Conse-
quently, the restraint in Bates was "compelled by direction of the State
preferred to base the decision on the absence of a state policy governing the distribution of
light bulbs. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result on the ground that the anticompetitive
harms outweighed its benefits. Justice Stewart dissented, joined by Justices Powell and
Rehnquist.
" Assuming an antitrust violation if state action provided no shield, a majority of the
Court recognized there "might" be instances when "private conduct required by state law is
exempted from the Sherman Act." 428 U.S. at 592.
First, if a private citizen has done nothing more than obey the command of his state
sovereign, it would be unjust to conclude that he has thereby offended federal law.
Second, if the State is already regulating an area of the economy, it is arguable that
Congress did not intend to superimpose the antitrust laws as an additional, and
perhaps conflicting, regulatory mechanism.
Id.
See generally Shenefield & Hartwell, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments 1975-
1976, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 7, 34-59 (1977).
435 U.S. at 410-11 n.40.
'7 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 585 (1976).
9 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
U The Court, however, did sustain the challenge on first amendment grounds. Id. at 363-
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acting as a sovereign." 0 Through prohibition, there has been compulsion
in a literal sense. The Court in Bates made no mention, however, of a
"threshold inquiry" in applying the Goldfarb compulsion standard to the
state bar's rules. The compulsion standard having been met, there was
nothing further to decide on antitrust grounds. Moreover, the challenged
"disciplinary rules reflect[ed] a clear articulation of the State's policy
with regard to professional behavior."" Application of the antitrust laws
were therefore inappropriate in Bates where state policy was "so clearly
and affirmatively expressed and . . . the State's supervision . . . so ac-
tive" in regulating the activities of the bar.
2
In light of Parker, Goldfarb, and Bates, it is not surprising that in City
of Lafayette the Court rejected the claim to automatic immunity for action
taken by municipalities. Prior case law had not even supported the propo-
sition of automatic immunity for actions by state agencies or officials.
However, the Court recognized that actions by municipalities "may reflect
state policy."13 Actions by municipalities are to be protected as state action
if undertaken pursuant to state policy. Therefore, the Court held:
[Tihe Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct en-
gaged in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by
its subdivisions, pursuant to state poicy to displace competition
with regulation or monopoly public service .
• . . This does not mean, however, that a political subdivision
necessarily must be able to point to a specific, detailed legislative
authorization before it properly may assert a Parker defense to an
antitrust suit. While a subordinate governmental unit's claim to
Parker immunity is not as readily established as the same claim
by state' government sued as such, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that an adequate state mandate for anticompetitive activ-
ities of cities and other subordinate government units exists when
it is found "from the authority given a governmental entity to
operate in a particular area, that the legislature contemplated the
kind of action complained of.""
Again, no mention was made of a threshold standard. Moreover, the
Court demonstrated that it was not limiting the applicability of the state
action doctrine to instances of compulsion of the kind evident in Bates.
With respect to government conduct, then, the plurality followed Parker,
thereby preserving "to the States their freedom under our dual system of
federalism to use their municipalities to administer state reguatory policies
free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws without at the same time
" Id. at 360 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)).
" 433 U.S. at 362.
hId.
3 435 U.S. at 413, 424.
" Id. at 413, 415 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d
431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)).
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permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation's free-market
goals."
5
The operation of federalism is apt to be frustrated, however, when as
in Cantor, the state action defense is denied to private parties acting under
state supervision within a regulatory scheme that restrains competition.
Just as a claim to protection by a municipality is not "as readily estab-
lished" as the "claim by a state government sued as such," private parties
might be subjected to an even more stringent application of the very same
standard applied to governmental entities. The Cantor standard for pri-
vate defendants serves only to confuse an already complicated doctrine.
The threshold standard appears to be left with the Chief Justice, who
coined the term in Goldfarb. After a determination that state policy
compels the type of conduct under review, he would then ask whether the
conduct was part of a governmental scheme to displace competition and
whether immunity is essential to make the scheme work. In his concurring
opinion in Cantor, the Chief Justice contended that it was unnecessary for
the plurality to have set forth its two-pronged test because there was no
state policy to displace competition." Only when such a policy exists is it
necessary to apply what amounts to the Cantor test, according to the Chief
Justice. He would have applied the Cantor test in City of Lafayette be-
cause the conduct in question was "proprietary" in nature and thus like
the conduct of private parties. 7 Although he had rejected the view of the
plurality in Cantor that Parker applies only to governmental defendants,
he too appears to adhere to two tests of state action-one for governmental
defendants acting in their governmental capacities, and one for private
parties and governmental entities engaged in "proprietary" conduct. Nev-
ertheless, the Chief Justice joined in the City of Lafayette result because
he believed that at a minimum the cities should be required to demon-
strate that their activities were "contemplated" by the state regulatory
scheme. 98
'5 435 U.S. at 415-16.
8 428 U.S. at 604-05.
,7 435 U.S. at 422. With respect to any conduct, it appears that the Chief Justice would
require, as a threshold, that the conduct be compelled within a regulatory scheme in order
to be protected under the state action doctrine. For private conduct and proprietary govern-
mental conduct, he would further require that state action immunity be "essential to the
State's plan." Id. at 425 n.6. The first part of the plurality's two-pronged test in Cantor may
be no more than a rearticulation of the Chief Justice's threshold standard. Both emphasize
conduct compelled by the state. The second part of the test, concerning congressional intent,
rests on the proposition that in considering whether state regulation gives rise to immunity,
the standard should be as strict as that applied to federal regulation arguably in conflict with
federal antitrust. Then the immunity must be necessary to make the regulatory scheme work
"and even then only to the minimum extent necessary." Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579, 597 (1976) (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch. 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)). This
part coincides with the Chief Justice's requirement that immunity be essential to making the
regulatory scheme work. In City-of Lafayette, the Chief Justice based his requirement on the
Cantor/Silver standard. 435 U.S. at 426 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
" Id. at 426 n.6. Justice Marshall in a separate concurrence agreed with the Chief Justice
that anticompetitive conduct unnecessary to effect a government purpose to displace compe-
tition was not to be allowed.
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Justice Stewart, as he did in Cantor, filed a lengthy dissent,"9 this time
emphasizing the distinction between governmental and private action and
declaring that the former was immune under Parker while the latter was
governed by the compulsion standard of Goldfarb. He expressed concern
over the vagueness he perceived in the plurality's test, the adverse impact
he foresaw on the operation of federalism, and the potentially extreme
economic impact on municipalities faced with antitrust litigation.9 0 He
correctly perceived what might be the practical consequence of City of
Lafayette: that cities will be looking (with no guarantee of success) toward
state legislatures for more specific and comprehensive enabling legislation
to justify their myriad activities. It remains to be seen whether the deci-
sion's impact will be as severe as Justice Stewart predicted. Although cities
can expect an increasing number of antitrust challenges,'"' flexible applica-
tion of the plurality's "contemplation" standard probably would do much
to alleviate his concern.' 2
b. Orrin Fox
The decision in New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co. "" cen-
tered on a procedural due process challenge to implementation of the Cali-
fornia Automobile Franchise Act. This statute requires an automobile
manufacturer to give notice to and obtain approval of the state's New
Motor Vehicle Board before opening an additional dealership in a market
of an existing dealer, if the existing dealer protests to the Board' 4 the
proposed establishment of the other dealership. The filing of a protest
suspends, without a prior hearing, the right of the manufacturer to open
the additional dealership.
Although the three-judge court that originally heard the case refused
to consider a possible conflict between the Franchise Act and the federal
antitrust laws, the antitrust issue was again argued on appeal from the
lower court's injunction.' 5 The argument was that the Act gave rise to
" Justice Stewart's dissent is analyzed in a student note, infra at 129.
, The power company's counterclaim was for $180 million in damages before trebling.
Brief for Petitioners at 21.
"I To paraphrase former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for antitrust, Joe Sims,
antitrust has arrived at Main Street. See "Antitrust Comes to Main Street," Remarks by Joe
Sims, Conference of the Municipal Finance Officers Association (May 15, 1978). Mr. Sims
points to licensing; utility and transportation services; operation of sports and convention
centers, airports, and parking lots; public health services; procurement practices; and zoning
as examples of municipal activities that may come under antitrust scrutiny.
I One decision preceding City of Lafayette holds that state intent to restrain competi-
tion "may be demonstrated by explicit language in state statutes, or may be inferred from
the nature of the powers and duties given to a particular government entity." Duke & Co.,
Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1280 (3d Cir. 1975); accord, Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and
Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated 98 S. Ct. 1123, judgment reinstated 1978-2
TIADE CAS. % 62,219 (7th Cir. 1978). These guides and others can be used to determine
whether conduct has been contemplated by a statute, an inquiry that is no more difficult or
obscure than-most that pervade antitrust.
"5 99 S. Ct. 403 (1978).
"5 Id. at 408-09.
"5 An action for declaratory and injunction relief was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2281
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privately initiated restraints of trade through the filing of protests which
delay the opening'of dealerships and sometimes lead to outright prohibi-
tions against openings.' 6 Thus, the state had granted private parties the
right to enjoin competition temporarily. It was asserted that such a right
was prohibited by Schwegmann v. Calvert Distillers Corp.'0
The conduct challenged in Schwegmann, however, was clearly violative
of the Sherman Act but for the possible protection of the Miller-Tydings
Act.' 8 In contrast, the mere unilateral filing of a protest in good faith
suggests no antitrust violation. Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized
that such protests are protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which
permits the concerted efforts of private parties to solicit government action
favorable to them.'' Consequently, the Court could have decided the case
on grounds other than the state action doctrine. Nevertheless, the Court
held that enforcement of the California Automobile Franchise Act was
exempt from the antitrust laws in that:
[T]he Act's regulatory scheme is a system of regulation, clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed, designed to displace un-
fettered business freedom in the matter of the establishment and
relocation of automobile dealerships. The regulation is therefore
outside the reach of the antitrust laws under the "state action"
exemption."0
The immunity was not sacrificed by permitting private parties, existing
dealers, to trigger action by the Board through the filing of protests. While
the Board determined whether there was good cause to prohibit opening a
dealership, the interim restraint against establishment or relocation of
franchisees was subject to ongoing state supervision.
With its emphasis on state supervision within a clearly prescribed sys-
tem of regulation designed to encroach upon normal competitive condi-
tions, the Court echoed part of its holding in Bates in circumstances that
resembled those in Parker. Further, as in Bates, there was no mention of
a threshold standard. Unlike Bates, however, there was no mention of
"compulsion," for the dealers were not compelled to protest. Nor was there
concern whether the defendants were governmental or private. The opera-
tion of the regulatory scheme rested on the activities of both state officials
(1970) before its repeal by the Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Public Law 94-381, § 1. Thus, the matter
was heard by a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1976) and was appealed
directly to the Supreme Court by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976). The lower court's decision
is reported as Orrin W. Fox Co. v. New Motor Veh. Bd., 440 F. Supp. 436 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
105 99 S. Ct. at 412.
101 See Brief for Appellants at 41-47; text accompanying note 71 supra.
10 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (proviso repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975)).
10 See Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1961)
and UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965).
" 99 S. Ct. at 412. The Court in Orrin Fox cited Parker, Bates, and City of Lafayette
as authority for its explanation of the state action doctrine. Id. There were no dissents to the
antitrust section of the Court's opinion, which was written by Justice Brennan.
[Vol. XXXVI
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
and private parties, and it was the role of the latter, the dealers, that
arguably made the scheme subject to antitrust challenge."' Had an anti-
trust action been brought against a protesting dealer, undoubtedly the
result would have been the same.
c. State Action in Context
In reexamining the state action doctrine from the vantage point of the
late 1970's, it should be recognized that the state action shelter arose from
application of the principles of federal preemption."' Preemption involves
the displacement of state law under the supremacy clause-Article VI of
the Constitution' 3-through federal legislation. In considering federal-
state relationships, the Court has applied an array of tests, but normally
it has focused on whether state and federal law conflict or interfere with
each other, and if so, whether such a conflict is irreconcilable.",
Although conventional preemption theory opposes giving true state reg-
ulation carte blanche, this is precisely what is accorded the states in their
regulation of competition. Since Parker, the preemption framework for
antitrust has been that states may directly contradict the aims and func-
tions of federal antitrust laws, so long as the states themselves, rather than
other entities acting in their guise, actually regulate. Cases examining
state action, then, are cases in which federal preemption is necessarily
absent. These cases merely represent an examination whether the chal-
lenged conduct ultimately is rooted in the state and carried out under its
supervision. While guidelines for this examination vary from those applica-
ble to preemption analysis, in each instance the Court must examine the
sensitive relations between the two levels of government that characterize
our federal system.
In spite of the Court's sometimes confusing rhetoric, it is reasonably
clear that the Court has not lost sight of what is at stake in applying the
state action doctrine. Although the Court has disserved clarity by saluting
principles concerning the relationship between federal antitrust and fed-
eral regulation,"5 City of Lafayette indicates that the Court will not focus
"I The dealers in Orrin Fox were like the producers in Parker who petitioned for the
agricultural niarketing program. Both groups were composed of private persons who did not
wear the mantle of the state. However, the dealers were purely private, unlike the producers
in Parker who were members of the program committee, and those acting on behalf of the
state bars in Goldfarb and Bates.
"I See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 JU.S. 389, 427 n.1
(Stewart, J., dissenting); FTC, Report of the State Regulation Task Force 1-10 (March 14,
1978); Handler, The Current Attack on the Parkerv. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM.
L. REv. 1 (1976).
I "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
" See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
", For example, in Cantor: "The Court has consistently refused to find that regulation
gave rise to an implied exemption without first determining that exemption was necessary
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more on principles of federalism. The plurality limited the notion of
"repeal [of antitrust laws] by implication" to the clash of federal regula-
tion with federal antitrust and pointed to state action, not as an exemp-
tion, but as one of the "implied exclusions from coverage of the antitrust
laws."'' The plurality emphasized that "a congressional purpose to sub-
ject to antitrust control the States' acts of government will not lightly be
inferred."" 7
Certain conclusions become apparent in light of the five Supreme Court
state action cases of'the 1970's in their historical context. In setting the
standard for conduct by municipalities and other subordinate government
entities, the plurality in City of Lafayette required state policy displacing
competition and contemplation by the legislature of the type of conduct
under review. The Court suggested that a less stringent application of this
same standard would be applied to state agencies. Orrin Fox suggests a
more stringent application to private parties of what basically is the same
standard. The type of conduct under review would have to be more clearly
expressed by the governing statute, and the conduct itself would have to
be subject to meaningful state supervision. Orrin Fox did not consider
application of the state action doctrine to a private party whose conduct
invoked state regulation of business practices and who remained subject
to that regulation. Surely, however, there is no significant difference for
purposes of the state action doctrine between triggering regulation and
remaining subject to it." '
in order to make the regulatory Act work, 'and even then only to the minimum extent
necessary.' Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 597 (1976) (quoting Silver v. New
York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); see note 97 supra.
"1 435 U.S. at 398 (emphasis added). Justice Stewart was quite right in pointing out in
Cantor that implied repeal of the federal antitrust laws through state regulation is impossible.
428 U.S. at 629 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
,, 435 U.S. at 412.
"' At least three recent lower court cases support this analysis. In United States v. Texas
State Board of Public Accountancy, 1978-1 TRADE CAS. 62,039 (W.D. Tex. 1978), the court
considered restrictions in price-related competitive bidding similar to those examined in
Engineers. The Board was essentially a quasi public entity, composed of licensed practicing
accountants appointed by the Governor. The Board had issued the restrictive regulation
pursuant to general statutory authority to "establish and maintain a high standard of integ-
rity in the profession of public accountancy .... " Id. at 74,475. In rejecting the Board's
assertion of state action, the court held that the enabling legislation did not mandate anti-
competitive conduct, nor could it be said that it "in anyway concerns or contemplates 'the
kind of action complained of' here." Id. at 74,477 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415).
The Third Circuit in Mobilfone v. Commonwealth Telephone Co., 571 F.2d 141 (3d Cir.
1978), upheld reliance on state action by a radio-telephone paging common carrier. Mobil-
fone, which served the area of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, had sought an injunction against
competing service to be established by Commonwealth. Both had been certified by the state's
Public Utilities Commission. Accepting Commonwealth's defense, the court rejected the
distinction between private and governmental defendants and interpreted Goldfarb, Cantor,
and Bates as requiring "that the state has an independent regulatory interest in the subject
matter of the antitrust controversy; that there exists a clear and affirmative articulation of




3. Barry and National Broiler: Two Word Games
The other two immunity cases, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
v. Barry"' and National Broiler Marketing Association b. United States,11
will have less impact than the three already discussed. In these two cases,
the Court construed specific statutory exemptions, without then creating
far-reaching judicial doctrine. Indeed, one may wonder why the Court
accepted these cases only to affirm decisions that had already rejected the
asserted exemptions. In Barry, the Court did resolve a split of opinion
among several circuits as to the scope of the term "boycott" under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act."' The granting of certiorari in National Broiler
is less understandable.' Whatever the reasons, the Court's affirmations
strengthen the view that few corners of commerce should completely es-
cape antitrust scrutiny. The Court's decisions in the five inimunity cases
discussed in this survey are of particular significance in light of the current
movement toward deregulation. The immunity quintet may be character-
ized as judicial deregulation.
These views were reinforced by the Third Circuit in Princeton Community Phone Book,
Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 424 (1978), in which the court
rejected a Sherman Act challenge to a prohibition against the purchase by attorneys of space
in the classified section of a community phone book. (A first amendment challenge, however,
was upheld. The court stated further that:
The weaker the relationship between the state and the defendant, the more clearly
the state must command the precise action taken by the defendant to enjoy the
state action exemption. Conversely, the clbser the relationship between the state
and the defendant, the less clearly the state need command the precise action for
the defendant to enjoy the exemption. As noted above, in the latter situation, the
state need only authorize action in a particular area.
582 F.2d at 719 (citing City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416; Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d
1277, 1280 (3d Cir. 1975)). In Bate, the prohibition was instituted by a committee of practic-
ing lawyers, the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, appointed by the New Jersey
Supreme Court. The committee's posture, then, was similar to that of the Texas State Board
of Public Accountancy. In Bate, the court found that the state as sovereign "did command
the kind of action the defendants took." 582 F.2d at 719 (emphasis added). Although the court
used the word "command," it is clear from the context of the opinion that there had been no
command to the committee to take the position that had been challenged. The phrase "kind
of action" is straight from City of Lafayette, which was discussed by the court and undoubt-
edly influenced its decision. Arguably, the Texas district court would have reached a different
conclusion. Each court, however, appeared to have applied essentially the same standard for
determining state action. See generally 1 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTrrausT LAw 207-
220 (1978).
"' 98 S. Ct. 2923 (1978).
' 436 U.S. 816 (1978).
2 See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 98 S. Ct. 2923, 2927 n.5 (1978).
in The Court granted certiorari because of "the importance of the issue for the agricul-
tural community and for the administration of the antitrust laws." 436 U.S. at 820. The case
was dignified by the appearances of University of Chicago Professor Richard A. Posner, who
argued for the Association, and John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division,.who argued for the government. Nevertheless, the Court had ex-
plained earlier that the issue before it was only "apparently" of importance to the broiler
industry and antitrust administration. 436 U.S. at 818.
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a. Barry
Barry was one offspring of the crisis over rapid escalation of medical
malpractice insurance rates in the early 1970's. 2 Following a change in
policy by St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., which placed strict limita-
tions on medical malpractice coverage through new policies and policy
renewals, the other three malpractice insurers in Rhode Island allegedly
agreed with St. Paul to refuse to sell insurance to St. Paul's policyholders.
Practicing physicians and their patients brought a class action alleging, in
part, a conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Defendants
successfully moved to dismiss the case on the ground of immunity under
section 2 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 2 The Supreme Court upheld the
First Circuit's reversal'5 of the dismissal.
. The McCarran-Ferguson Act'12 was passed in 1945 in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association'9 (SEUA), which had been decided the year before. In SEUA
the Court held that the sale of insurance was within interstate commerce
and, therefore, subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act. Prior to that
decision, the sale of insurance had been considered outside interstate com-
merce and thus exclusively under state control.12 The McCarran-Ferguson
Act represented an attempt to restore that control by conferring upon
persons "engaged" in the "business of insurance" an exemption from the
federal antitrust laws to the extent such business is regulated by state
law.'12 However, section 3(b) of the Act states that nothing contained in
'2 Brief Amici Curiae of the American Insurance Association, the Alliance of America
Insurers, and the National Association of Independent Insurers at 6-10.
124 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976).
125 Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1977). The district court
opinion was not reported.
In 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
'- 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
In See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
In Sections 2 and 3 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012, 1013 (1976),
provide in relevant part:
Sec. 2(a). The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation
of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act of
July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15,
1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914,
known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
law.
Sec. 3(b). Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman
Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boy-
cott, coercion, or intimidation.
[Vol. XXXVI
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
the Act "shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement
to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimida-
tion."''1 Some courts narrowly construed this exception to apply only to
conduct of insurance companies against other participants within the in-
surance industry.'
In Barry, the Supreme Court held "that the term 'boycott' is not lim-
ited to concerted activity against insurance companies or agents, or more
generally, against competitors of members of the boycotting group."'
3 2
Finding that the "conduct in question accords with the common under-
standing of a boycott," the Court concluded that the exception to the
exemption was applicable.' = The alleged concerted refusal by other insur-
ance companies to sell insurance to St. Paul's policyholders was subject
to federal antitrust scrutiny.
Arguably, Bary has provided the plaintiffs' antitrust bar with an im-
portant new weapon. Justice Stewart, who has become the Court's fore-
most dissenter in immunity cases, contended that the majority's expansive
reading of "boycott" compels a similar reading of "coercion". and
"intimidation," which would "plainly devour the broad antitrust immun-
ity bestowed by § 2(b)."' 3 Justice Stewart read the legislative history of
the Act as limiting application of the section 3(b) exception to members
of the insurance industry.
The potential new weapon, however, may lack ammunition. Writing for
the seven-man majority,' = Justice Powell alluded to the narrow scope of
the decision. Case law, he contended, failed to support any suggestion by
the-dissent that the terms of section 3(b), "are coextensive with the prohi-
bitions of the Sherman Act."'35 The precise issue before the Court in Barry
was whether the challenged conduct was a boycott for the purpose of
McCarran-Ferguson immunity-not whether the conduct was per se un-
reasonable,'1 as it normally would be characterized if deemed a group
boycott under the Sherman Act. Characterization of the conduct as a
boycott depended on conventional Sherman Act analysis of concerted re-
fusals to deal.
Moreover, the Court explained that the conduct in question occurred
outside any regulatory arrangement instituted by the state.138 The Court
" 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976); see note 129 supra.
' See, e.g., Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975); Addrisi v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1975); Transnational Ins. Co. v.
Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Or. 1966). But see Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977). (cases construing § 3(b) more broadly).
"72 98 S. Ct. at 2935.
I" Id.
14 Id. at 2939 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Court refrained from considering the mean-
ing of "coercion" and "intimidation." Id. at 2929 n.10.
" Justice Rehnqui~t joined the dissent of Justice Stewart.
"37 98 S. Ct. at 2932 n.18.
" Id. at 2930.
In Id. at 2936.
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refused to decide whether "state regulatory direction or authorization"
would have been considered under section 3(b) or "whether it comes into
play as part of a possible defense under the 'state action' doctrine as
elaborated in Parker v. Brown. . . and its progeny."'39 The answer would
depend on the extent of regulation and the nature of the conduct. In Barry,
there had been no disp'ute over the application of section 2(b).110 Yet it is
less than clear that section 2(b) in fact would have afforded protection but
for section 3(b). The test of the 2(b) exemption is "whether the state has
'generally authorized or permitted certain standards of conduct,' ", a
more liberal test than that of state action. Nonetheless, it is difficult to
characterize the conduct challenged in Barry as having been even
"generally authorized" by the state. Had the Court not found a boycott,
it is still possible the exemption would not have been available.
If section 3(b) turns out to be construed as broadly as Justice Stewart
fears, and the breadth of section 2(b) is eroded, insurance defendants may
still seek the more confined shelter of the state action doctrine. Since the
McCarran-Ferguson Act has been described as "an enunciation of the
Parker v. Brown decision,"1 2 the narrowing scope of state action may have
influenced the Court's decision in Barry. Replacing the broad section 2(b)
exemption with immunity under the state action doctrine would have the
effect of narrowing the section, not "devouring" it. Perhaps it is time for
the insurance industry to be placed on the same footing as other forms of
state-regulated conduct.'
b. National Broiler
Little need be said about National Broiler. After examining a variety
of mechanistic definitions of the term "farmers,"'' Justice Blackmun,
speaking for a seven-man majority, did little more than reveal one example
of what a farmer is not.
The exemption at issue was section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act,'"
which provides that "persons engaged in the production of agricultural
131 Id. at 2937 n.27. For a discussion of the state action doctrine, see text accompanying
notes 53-102 supra.
"' See Brief for Petitioners at 7.
", Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972) (quoting California League of Independent Ins. Producers v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959)).
"I Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 87 (E.D.N.C. 1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 870
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
"1 See the discussion infra at 308-22, regarding recommendations of the National Com-
mission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, which include recommended repeal
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
"I E.g., "[A] person or other entity cannot generically be a farmer without owning or
operating a farm on which an agricultural commodity is produced." Brief for American Farm
Bureau as Amicus Curiae at 5. The term "farmers" was meant by Congress "to mean holders
of land, owners of farms, occupiers of farms, persons cultivating their own land, tillers of the
soil, and so on." Brief for the United States at 13.
145 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
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products as farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers
may act together in associations . . in collectively processing, preparing
for marketing, handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign com-
merce, such products of persons so engaged." Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist
Growers, Inc."' held that all members of such an association must be
within one of the categories enumerated by the statute; otherwise the
association is not entitled to protection under the Act.' In National
Broiler, each member of the marketing Association was "integrated," in
that each participated in more than one of the several stages of production
of broiler chickens."' Although the members generally contracted with
independent growers for the raising or "grow-out" of at least part of their
breeding flocks, six members neither owned nor controlled any flock or
hatchery, and three of these maintained no grow-out facility. Thus, these
members, who bought chicks after they had hatched and placed them with
growers, were, in the Court's view, more like processors than farmers and
therefore placed the Association beyond protection of the Capper-Volstead
Act."
9
The Court carefully avoided the question whether the remaining asso-
ciation members would have been entitled to protection despite integra-
tion by most of the members. Justice Brennan, concurring, emphatically
concluded they would not be protected."' Justice White, joined by Justice
Stewart in dissent, correctly noted the failure of the majority to provide a
"functional definition""' was a disappointing result in light of the Court's
recognition that the Act was "to aid only those whose economic position
rendered them comparatively helpless."1" 2 Why the chicken breeders,
hatchers and growers were helpless compared to those who bought chickens
after they were already hatched was left to surmise. The Court simply
assumed that the three members played an economic role
"indistinguishable" from that of the processor or packer.ss This conclu-
sion, and the decision generally, offers no aid to counsel seeking to advise
clients on the scope of the Capper-Volstead exemption.
C. Exxon: A Postscript on State Regulation
In another case in which state legislation was challenged as contrary
to federal antitrust law, the Supreme Court again expressed an attitude
of restraint toward interfering with the power of states to regulate competi-
389 U.S. 384 (1967).
"7 Id. at 395-96.
Stages include the raising and breeding of flocks to produce eggs, hatching of the eggs
and placement of the chicks, production of feed for them, raising of the chicks, removing them
to processing facilities, and operation of those facilities to prepare them for market. National
Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 820-21 (1978).
"' 389 U.S. at 393-96.
"' 436 U.S. at 829 (Brennan, J., concurring).
' Id. at 840 (White, J., dissenting).
's' Id. at 826.
" Id. at 827-28.
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tion within their borders. The Court illustrated its concern for the dynam-
ics of federalism by refusing to invoke the doctrine of federal preemption
in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland'" and by reaffirming the state
action doctrine in Orrin Fox. "I In each case, the Court upheld state legisla-
tion which may have had anticompetitive effects.
Since the suit in Exxon was for a declaratory judgment and no antitrust
violation was alleged, the state action doctrine had no application as it did
in Orrin Fox where implementation of a state statute was challenged as a
restraint of trade. In Exxon, several major oil companies challenged the
validity of a Maryland requirement that a producer of petroleum products
must extend its "voluntary allowances""' to all service stations the produ-
cer supplied in the state.'57 The companies argued that the requirement
conflicted with the proviso of section 2(b) of the Clayton Act, as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act which allows a localized price reduction by
a supplier in good faith to meet competition.'58 They further argued that
the requirement of uniform allowances conflicted with the nation's anti-
trust policy favoring vigorous price competition.'
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments. Contrary to the produ-
cer's assertions, the Maryland requirement would not frustrate "the Con-
gressional accommodation between the overall Sherman Act policy of pro-
moting and indeed requiring competitive pricing practices and the
Robinson-Patman Act policy of eliminating anti-competitive price dis-
criminations."'' 0
'5 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
'5 98 S. Ct. 403 (1978); see text accompanying notes 103-11 supra.
'5 437 U.S. at 119-20, 129-34. Although the state statute is silent on the meaning of
"voluntary allowances," the Maryland Court of Appeals defined the term as temporary price
reductions granted to retail dealers to enable the retailers to meet lower prices of their
competitors. Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102, 1122 (1977).
Based on this definition, the court of appeals found no conflict with the meeting competition
defense of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 1122-24. The court held that the meeting competi-
tion defense would not cover a price reduction given by an oil company to its own dealer to
meet the lower price of a competing dealer. Id. at 1124-25.
'"1 437 U.S. at 119-20, 129-34.
'5 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits anticom-
petitive price discrimination. Id. § 13(a). However, § 2(b) provides that price discrimination
is justified if "made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor .... Id. §
13(b).
5" 437 U.S. at 131.
"' Brief of Appellants, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978), at 56.
The basic provisions of the Maryland statute, MD. CODE ANN. art. 56, § 157E (Supp. 1978),
prohibit the operation of retail service stations after a specified date by producers or refiners
of petroleum products. These provisions were challenged unsuccessfully on substantive due
process and commerce clause grounds. 437 U.S. at 124-29.
The statute was an outgrowth of the 1973 oil shortage, during which producers suppos-
edly had discriminated in supply and price against independent dealers in favor of company
owned stations. Id. at 121. Prior to the efective date of the statute, certain producers filed a
declaratory judgment action in a Maryland circuit court challenging the statute on several
constitutional and federal statutory grounds, some of which were not asserted before the
Supreme Court. Id. at 122 n.5.
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The Court found that there was no specific conflict between the Mary-
land statute and the "meeting competition", defense of section 2(b). There
was no preemption even assuming the defense would be available to a
producer that offered a price reduction to its retailer, to meet a competing
retailer's price which was subsidized by its own supplier."' That the Mary-
land statute required statewide uniformity where federal law would permit
local discrimination was a "hypothetical conflict . . . not sufficient to
warrant preemption."'6 2 Section 2(b) affords no right to localized discrimi-
nation but is merely a narrow exception to the Robinson-Patman Act's
broad prohibition against price discrimination.' Moreover, compliance
with the statute would not expose the producers to Robinson-Patman lia-
bility, for uniform price reduction is not discrimination, and potential
discrimination affecting areas immediately outside state boundaries could
be avoided by extending a price reduction to those areas as well. "4
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the statute would disturb
the "delicate balance struck by Congress. between the purposes of the
Robinson-Patman Act and the Sherman Act.""' The Court interpreted
this argument as "merely another way of stating that the Maryland statute
will have an anticompetitive effect."" Although such an effect does con-
flict with the policy of the Sherman Act, "if an adverse effect on competi-
tion were, in and of itself, enough to render a state statute invalid, the
State's power to engage in economic regulation would be effectively de-
stroyed." 7 This same conclusion was expressed in support of the Court's
decision in Orrin Fox."' Both Orrin Fox and Exxon point to a minimum
of judicial interference with increasing state regulation aimed at requiring
new business practices or protecting existing ones."'
In rejecting the argument that the statute discriminated against and unduly burdened
interstate commerce, the Court explained that a burden placed on interstate companies by
the statute did not in itself establish discrimination. Nor would interstate commerce be
burdened because some business could be expected to shift from some interstate suppliers to
others. Id. at 127. Thus, the Court underscored the view that the antitrust laws are to protect
competition, not competitors. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
Similarly, the Court's decision lends support to certain' defenses in Sherman Act cases on the
ground that any restraint of trade has not substantially and adversely affected interstate
commerce. E.g., Dominion Parking Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 450 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Va.
1978) (substitution of one parking lot operator for another as result of alleged conspiracy,
while affecting former operator, did not substantially affect interstate commerce).
"' 437 U.S. at 129-30.
2 Id. at 131.
'' Id. at 131-32.
'" Id. at 130 n.21, 131 n.22.
16 Brief of Appellants at 80.
' 437 U.S. at 133.
Id.
" 99 S. Ct. 403, 411 (1978).
" State regulation of competition is not necessarily anticompetitive. In Exxon, for ex-
ample, the state of Maroland argued that the statute reflected a concern for an overly broad
interpretation of the meeting conipetition defense by federal antitrust enforcement authori-
ties. Brief of Appellees at 42-52. Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act is discretionary. If
a seller chooses, he may selectively rely on § 2(b):
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D. Gypsum and Price Fixing: Rejection of One Defense and Creation of
Another
1. Accommodating the Robinson-Patman Act with the Sherman Act
In Uhited States v. United States Gypsum Co., 70 the Court again con-
fronted the "delicate balance" between the Sherman Act and the
Robinson-Patman Act, this time in a criminal prosecution of a conspiracy
to fix prices in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' The Court
rejected the Third Circuit's holding that direct verification of a competi-
tor's price pursuant to a Robinson-Patman meeting competition defense,
cannot be the basis of Sherman Act liability. Nevertheless, the Court
affirmed the circuit court's reversal'72 of criminal convictions in the lower
court. In doing so, the Court fashioned a new test for determining intent
in a criminal antitrust case.
The case began in 1971 with a 28-month grand jury investigation of the
gypsum board industry, a highly concentrated industry producing the type
of wall board that forms the main component of interior walls and ceilings
in residential and commercial structures. Gypsum board is a fungible
produce, and competition in this industry revolves primarily around price,
credit terms and delivery services."7 In December 1973, an indictment was
filed against six major manufacturers and several of their corporate execu-
tives.'74 At the core of the charges was the allegation that the defendants
"telephoned or otherwise contacted one another to exchange and discuss
current and future published or market prices and published or standard
terms and conditions of sale and to ascertain alleged deviations there-
from. '"'75 Although the defendants disputed the alleged scope and duration
of these price verification activities, they rested their case primarily on the
contention that a lawful purpose justifies exchange of information among
competitors even when the exchange results in increased price stability.
7 6
"Selective price discounts allow sellers to suppress competition, especially from
independent, non-branded dealers, in a relatively small area without offering lower
prices on a new generalized basis .... [T]o expand the § 2(b) defense to permit
petroleum suppliers to extend localized, discriminatory price cuts to a retail dealer
to enable that dealer to meet the lower price of a competing retail dealer, which is
subsidized by a price cut by the supplier's competitor, would be inconsistent with
the purpose and legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act."
Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102, 1124 (1977). The Mary-
land statute prohibited selective price discounts.
£70 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978).
" Id. at 2868; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
" United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977).
, 98 S. Ct. at 2868.
m The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the indictments. United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 383 F. Supp. 462 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
,7 98 S. Ct. at 2869 (quoting from specification (h) of the indictment).
,7' Id. at 2869; see Respondents' Joint Brief at 21-43. Other defenses asserted by the
defendants included allegedly unreasonable preindictment delay, unsuccessfully argued be-
fore both the district court and the court of appeals; erroneous jury instructions on participa-
tion in the conspiracy, which the Supreme Court found sufficient; erroneous instructions on
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The defendants argued that their lawful purpose was twofold. First,
verification of prices through direct communications with competitors was
necessary to confirm a customer's claim of a more favorable offer from a
competitor, thereby enabling the seller to meet competition in "good faith"
pursuant to section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 7 7 Second, verifica-
tion was necessary to protect the seller from fraud or misrepresentation on
the part of its customer.17 8 Thus, the defendants argued that verification
was within the so-called "controlling circumstance" exception to Sherman
Act liability. 9
The controlling circumstance language stems from a passage in United
States v. Container Corp.,' a civil action in which the government
charged that exchange of price information as to specific customers
amounted to price fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
defendants in Container argued that their conduct was not illegal on the
basis of Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v. United States.5
Justice Douglas distinguished Cement Manufacturers:
While there was present here, as in [Cement Manufacturers],
an exchange of prices to specific customers, there was absent the
controlling circumstance, viz., that cement manufacturers, to pro-
tect themselves from delivering to contractors more cement than
was needed for a specific job and thus receiving a lower price,
exchanged price information as a means of protecting their legal
rights from fraudulent inducements to deliver more cement than
needed for a specific job."'2
Since Container, several courts have seized on Justice Douglas' con-
trolling circumstance language to create an "exception" to Sherman Act
liability for exchanges of price information made for the purpose of estab-
lishing a meeting competition defense under section 2(b) of the Robinson-
Patman Act.' The Supreme Court in Gypsum, however, did not directly
withdrawal from the conspiracy, which the Court decided constituted reversible error; and
the impropriety of ex parte communications between the trial judge and the jury foreman,
which the Supreme Court also held was a sufficient basis for reversal. 98 S. Ct. at 2867-69.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White joined the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court;
Justices Stewart and Powell joined except as to Part IV of the opinion concerning communica-
tions between court and jury foreman; Justice Powell further took issue with a portion of Part
1H concerning the asserted defense under the Robinson-Patman Act; Justice Stevens joined
except as to Part II, concerning the test for intent, as to which he dissented; Justice Rehnquist
dissented except as to the introduction to the opinion and the portion concerning the instruc-
tion on participation in the conspiracy; Justice Blackmun took no part in consideration of
the case.
' 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). This section permits a discriminatory price to be "made in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor."
171 98 S. Ct. at 2879 n.24.
'n Id. at 2879.
"' 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
268 U.S. 588 (1925).
l 393 U.S. at 335 (emphasis added).
" See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 123-27 (3d Cir.
1977); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 181-82 (10th Cir. 1972); Wall Prods. Co. v.
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address the existence and scope of the so-called controlling circumstance
exception because the Court found no conflict between the Sherman Act
and the Robinson-Patman Act that would require modification of conven-
tional Sherman Act enforcement. '" Thus, the Court ruled that "meeting
competition" was not a controlling circumstance and reserved for another
day the question whether the "exception" may exist.
The absence of a conflict between the two antitrust acts should have
been apparent more than 30 years ago when the Court in FTC v. A.E.
Staley Manufacturing Co."" held that the good faith standard of meeting
competition "does not require the seller[s] to justify price discrimination
by showing that in fact they met a competitor's price."'88 Nevertheless, the
Court in Staley Manufacturing had rejected the meeting competition de-
fense, in part because of the failure "to investigate or verify" oral informa-
tional reports." 7 In Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, '" decided the same
day as Staley Manufacturing, the Court rejected the defense because of the
lack of "personal knowledge of the transactions" on the part of witnesses
who assumed competitive justifications for price discrimination.'89 The
Gypsum Court recognized that the language in Staley Manufacturing and
Corn Products "suggested" that direct verification of discounts was neces-
sary to make out a section 2(b) defense.19 However, none of the courts
permitting interseller verification as a defense to Sherman Act liability
had held that such verification was required by the Robinson-Patman Act.
National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295, 312-15 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
The "controlling circumstance" exception advanced by the defendants in Gypsum was
the result of an excessive reading of the language in Container Corp. In Cement
Manufacturers, the Court did not create an "exception" to Sherman Act liability, but found
that the information exchange was designed to prevent purchasers of cement from taking
unfair advantage of the sellers. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588,
595 (1925). The need to protect against buyers' fraud was a distinguishing feature that was
prominent in the Court's application of the rule of reason to the information exchange. Id. at
606.
In Container, there was an anticompetitive effect, according to the Court. Occasional
direct and reciprocal communications between competitors concerning prices in the oligopol-
istic corrugated container industry was sufficient to create "irrestible" inferences that "the
exchange of price information has had an anticompetitive effect in the industry, chilling the
vigor of price competition." 393 U.S. at 337. The Court's finding of increased potential for
interdependent pricing in Container contrasts clearly with the finding in Cement Manu-
facturers that the exchange of price information was neutral with respect to the firms'
interdependence. See 268 U.S. 588, 606 (1925). See generally Note, Antitrust Liability for
Exchange of Price Information- What Happened To Container Corporation?, 63 VA. L. Rzv.
639 (1977).
lu 98 S. Ct. at 2880. The Court stated that a defendant's purpose would not "insulate
him from liability unless it is deemed of sufficient merit to justify a general exception to the
Sherman Act's proscriptions." Id. at 2879 n.23 (citing Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 588.(1925)).
1- 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
"4 Id. at 758.
" Id.
"4 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
i8s Id. at 741.
IN 98 S. Ct. at 2881; see note 183 supra.
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The Third Circuit in Gypsum followed these cases but prescribed its own
set of circumstances in which interseller verification would be permitted.
19'
The Supreme Court in Gypsum summarized the meeting competition
defense as requiring a "good faith belief, rather than an absolute certainty,
that a price concession is being offered to meet an equally low price offered
by a competitor .. ."I" Acquiring such a belief does not compel a seller
to discuss prices with competitors. Besides, the Court observed, there is
as much incentive among competitors to misrepresent price as there is
among customers. 193 Direct communications, to the extent they are recipro-
cal, tend to defeat their own purpose. If price concessions cannot be kept
from competitors, there is little incentive to offer them."' The Court also
recognized that direct communications necessarily afford opportunities
"for the growth of prohibited anticompetitive activity."'95
Having concluded that interseller verification is not required to estab-
lish good faith, it was unnecessary for the Court to chart a path toward
satisfaction of the good faith standard. The Court did provide some direc-
tion, however, for determining how to employ the section 2(b) shelter. By
saying that "casual reliance on uncorroborated reports of buyers or sales
representatives without further investigation may not. . . be sufficient to
make the requisite showing of good faith,"'99 the Court implied that
thoughtful reliance may be proper. The seller may be able to show there
was no reason to doubt the veracity of a prospective buyer. And when the
seller has "vague, generalized doubts,"'9 7 he is entitled to make the sale if
"after making reasonable, lawful, inquiries [he] cannot ascertain that the
buyer is lying. . .-. gs Threatened refusals to buy, consistent reports from
several customers, and corroborating documents or market data would
tend to support an assertion that a lower price is available from a compet-
ing seller. 9
More specific doubts might not be disspelled in spite of all reasonable
efforts to do so, and the Court suggested that at times the meeting compe-
tition defense may not be available. Justice Powell was concerned over the
possible effect of withholding the defense in the face of every reasonable
effort to verify information.' This might lead a prudent seller to forego a
price reduction, he said. Nevertheless, under Staley's test of establishing
"facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that
the granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low price of a
"1 550 F.2d at 126.
,2 98 S. Ct. at 2881.
", Id. at 2883.
"' Id. at 2883-4.
"' Id. at 2884.
'" Id. at 2881 (emphasis added).
"s Id. at 2882.
"' Id. at 2882 n.29 (quoting Brief for United States at 86, United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978)).
"' Id. at 2882.
Id. at 2890.
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competitor,""' the meeting competition defense occasionally will be unat-
tainable. As the Court concluded in Exxon, there is no "right" to meet
competition through price discrimination."'2
2. Criminal Antitrust: Purpose, Intent, and Knowledge
a. Intent as an Element of the Violation
Although the Gypsum Court rejected the defense argument that a law-
ful purpose will shelter price exchanges from Sherman Act liability, the
Court refused to accept the government's position that purpose is irrele-
vant if anticompetitive effect is shown. Relying primarily on Container,
the government insisted that "this Court's long-standing rule [is] that an
agreement among sellers to exchange information on current offering prices
violates section 1 of the Sherman Act if it has either the purpose or the
effect of stabilizing prices.""2 3 The Court held, however, that an effect on
prices, without more, was insufficient to support a criminal conviction
under the Sherman Act.
2 0 4
The trial court in Gypsum had instructed the jury as follows:
[T]he law presumes that a person intends the necessary and
natural consequences of his acts. Therefore, if the effect of the
exchanges of pricing information was to raise, fix, maintain and
stabilize prices, then the parties to them are presumed, as a matter
of law, to have intended that result.
2 5
Although this instruction would not have been improper in a civil antitrust
enforcement action, it was reversible error in a criminal proceeding be-
cause it minimized the element of intent. On this point the Gypsum Court
held:
[A] defendant's state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal
antitrust offense which must be established by evidence and infer-
ences drawn therefrom and cannot be taken from the trier of fact
through reliance on a legal presumption of wrongful intent from
proof of an effect on prices. . . .We are unwilling to construe the
Sherman Act as mandating a regime of strict liability criminal
offenses."'
This holding extended previous case law. Since United States v. Patten
in 1913, conventional antitrust wisdom had held:
[C]onspirators must be held to have intended the necessary and
direct consequences of their acts and cannot be heard to say the
21 324 U.S. at 759-60.
2 See text accompanyihg notes 154-69 supra.
"' 98 S. Ct. at 2872 (quoting Reply Brief for United States at 1).
2 98 S. Ct. at 2872.
21 Id. at 2869 (emphasis added).
2N Id. at 2872-73.
- 226 U.S. 525 (1913).
[Vol. XXXVI
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
contrary. In other words, by purposely engaging in a conspiracy
which necessarily and directly produces the result which the stat-
ute is designed to prevent, they are, in legal contemplation,
chargeable with intending that result."'
This policy was not challenged directly by the defendants in Gypsum since
their controlling circumstance defense did not necessitate an attack of such
scope. Moreover, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent, the defi-
cient instruction concerning presumption of intent was just one instruction
among many, covering some 40 pages of record, and did not constitute
reversible error in view of several other instructions that purpose be taken
into account."0 ' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reached out to affirm the
Third Circuit's reversal. The reason for doing so likely arose from changes
in criminal antitrust law enforcement.
The complaint in Gypsum was filed prior to the enactment of legisla-
tion in 197410 raising criminal violation of the Sherman Act from a misde-
meanor to a felony and increasing the maximum fines substantially.2 1 The
changing nature of criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act 212 undoubt-
edly influenced the Supreme Court's decision to analyze carefully the in-
tent element of the offense. Also, the Court was influenced by the general
nature of the Sherman Act, which, "unlike most traditional criminal stat-
Id. at 543; accord, United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948). See also Nash
v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1913). In Nash the Court rejected the contention that
the Sherman Act is too vague to justify criminal enforcement. The intent addressed in
Gypsum, Patton and Griffith concerns the intent to implement the conspiracy. A threshold
question of intent concerns the formation of the conspiracy. See 98 S. Ct. at 2876 n.20.
2" 98 S. Ct. at 2891 (Rhenquist J., concurring and dissenting).
210 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706
(amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976)).
211 In addition to raising a Sherman Act criminal violation to a felony, the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act, see note 210 supra, increased the penalty for individual viola-
tors to a maximum of three years imprisonment and a fine of $100,000. Also, corporate
violators face a 1 million dollar fine for violation of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3
(1976).
2I The increased penalties for violations of the Sherman Act, see note 211 supra, have
injected the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department with'new vitality. During the four
years immediately preceding the 1974 amendment to the Sherman Act, see note 210 supra,
the Division initiated 64 merger cases and 52 criminal cases. Criminal indictments were
issued against 114 individuals. During the four years following the amendment, the Division
brought 128 criminal cases while reducing the number of merger cases to 29. During this
period indictments were issued against 359 individuals. See Antitrust Report (June 1978) at
21, 16 BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS, ANTrrRusT LAW & TRADE REGULATION (von Kalinowski, ed.
June, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Report].
The severity of sentences against antitrust violators has increased. The Antitrust Divi-
sion reports an increase in individual fines from $755,200 in fiscal 1977 to $1,093,750 in fiscal
1978. Corporate fines increased from $2.6 million to almost $11 million. In fiscal 1977, 24
individuals received a total of 1,561 days in jail. In fiscal 1978 jail sentences for 29 individuals
totaled 2,921 days. See Address by John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, presented to Corporate Counsel Institute, Chicago, Illinois, at 8 (Oct. 4, 1978)
[hereinafter, cited as Shenefield address]. These figures are striking when one considers that
from 1890-1970, only 19 individuals were sentenced to jail for Sherman Act violations. See
Antitrust Report, supra at 23.
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utes, does not, in clear and categorical terms, precisely identify the con-
duct which it proscribes.""' 3 Consequently, Sherman Act liability without
regard to intent can lead to "overdeterrence"-too much caution by busi-
nessmen, with a dampening effect on competition.2 1,
b. The Element of Knowledge and Its Impact
The Supreme Court in Gypsum avoided the extreme of requiring
specific intent to violate the law or purpose to achieve anticompetitive
effects.2 11 Instead, the Court opted for a standard of knowledge, drawing
direction from the ALI Model Penal Code."' The Court concluded that
"action undertaken with knowledge of its probable consequences and hav-
ing the requisite anticompetitive effects can be a sufficient predicate for a
finding of criminal liability under the antitrust laws. ' '21 7 Conduct accompa-
nied by anticompetitive purpose also would support liability, even absent
anticompetitive effects if a conspiracy could be proven.
218
Theoretically the question of specific intent remains open because
Gypsum did not concern a felony prosecution. However, post-Gypsum ar-
guments that the 1974 amendment to the Sherman Act implicitly imposed
a requirement of specific intent have been rejected.219 Although the
222 98 S. Ct. at 2876 n.18.
2" Id. at 2875-76. Also, the Court was doubtlessly influenced by the fact that the inter-
seller price verification in Gypsum had been undertaken on advice of counsel who may have
been genuinely concerned with the burden of establishing a meeting competition defense. See
Respondents' Joint Brief, supra note 176, at 11-13.
"I The Court did not cite any antitrust cases addressing the question of criminal intent,
although the Court cited United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948), as indirect
authority for the proposition that unfulfilled anticompetitive purpose would support liability.
See 98 S. Ct. at 2877 n.21.
In the first criminal antitrust case brought under the 1974 amendment, see note 210
supra, a federal district court suggested that the conventional standard of proof of criminal
conspiracy may apply in antitrust prosecutions. See United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc., 433
F. Supp. 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (proof of a purpose was essential to the prosecution of an
indirect price-fixing conspiracy). Cf. United States v. Noll Mfg. Co., 1977-2 TRADE CAS.
61,712 at 72,906-07 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (court noted that Nu-Phonics did not require proof of
specific intent; Congress left traditional elements of Sherman Act offense undisturbed).
21, 98 S. Ct. at 2878; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
227 98 S. Ct. at 2877.
"I2 Id. at n.21.
211 E.g., United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In
Continental Group, the court, in denying post-conviction motions, cited Gypsum as support-
ing the long-established rule that proof of specific intent is not required in an antitrust
misdemeanor case. The court also cited legislative history to support its view that Congress
did not intend in 1974 to change the substantive elements of a Sherman Act offense. Although
the court quoted the knowledge standard of Gypsum, it did so only in the context of consider-
ing knowing participation in the conspiracy, after which it relied on the Patten principle that
conspirators must be held to intend the "necessary and direct consequences of their acts."
Id. at 716-18. Thus, the court treated Gypsum as having made no changes at all in criminal
antitrust enforcement. Id. Cf. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 1978-2 TRDE CAS.
62,359 at 76,156 (motion for acquittal denied on ground that there was sufficient evidence
of criminal intent to permit a new trial).
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Gypsum Court addressed conduct occurring prior to 1974, the Court clearly
was concerned with the implications of felonious conduct occurring under
the Sherman Act.
By no means, however, will Gypsum be the final word on criminal
intent in antitrust proceedings. Nor is the decision likely to have the lim-
ited impact predicted by the government. In arriving at its decision to
make knowledge the standard of criminal intent in antitrust enforcement,
the Supreme Court cited the Antitrust Division's 1967 guidelines that
criminal prosecutions should be undertaken only against willful viola-
tions.12 The Head of the Antitrust Division, Assistant Attorney General
Shenefield, has repeated this theme, declaring recently that Gypsum does
not represent a significant change, at least insofar as per se offenses are
concerned: "Per se offenses are those for which no justification or defense
can be offered."'2 Conduct that "clearly constitutes a per se offense carries
with it its own intent.' '12 According to Shenefield this is the type of con-
duct that is prosecuted criminally.
The Antitrust Division's attempt to minimize the impact of Gypsum
may be unjustified. Yet if Gypsum's knowledge standard is interpreted as
requiring only general knowledge that some unidentified anticompetitive
effects will follow, then the impact of Gypsum will be slight. However, such
an interpretation would conflict with the concern in Gypsum over the
distinction between unlawful anticompetitive conduct and "the gray zone
of socially acceptable and economically justifiable business conduct."
Gypsum implies that more than mere general knowledge-perhaps knowl-
edge of substantial anticompetitive impact, if not of specific anticompeti-
tive effects-may be required to satisfy the intent element.
Thus, in so-called indirect price-fixing cases, such as Gypsum, defense
counsel can be expected to marshal voluminous evidence to demonstrate
purity of purpose and inadequate knowledge of anticompetitive conse-
quences. Purpose is relevant to determining what a defendant foresaw the
consequences of his conduct to be, and evidence on both purpose and
knowledge will enhance the confusion that inevitably arises in trying to
implicate numerous defendants in a conspiracy, the precise effects of
which may be unclear. If economists must be called to testify as to actual
effects, can businessmen be held to have knowledge that such effects were
"probable," especially if there is significant disagreement over what the
effects actually are? Although the Supreme Court recognized that an effect
on prices "may well support an inference that the defendant had knowl-
edge of the probability of such a consequence at the time he acted, the jury
must remain free to consider additional evidence before accepting or re-
jecting the inference."'
A per se violation is merely an extension of the rule of reason. When
2" 98 S. Ct. at 2875 n.15.
2' Shenefield Address, supra note 212, at 11.
2 Id.
2" 98 S. Ct. at 2875.
22 Id. at 2878.
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conduct is deemed unreasonable, it is unnecessary to engage in elaborate
proof of effect. Yet the government in a criminal antitrust action must
prove an agreement and show what the agreement was designed to accom-
plish. Even assuming concerted action, the less clear the purpose of the
conduct, the more important it will be for the government to demonstrate
effect and some degree of foreknowledge about this effect. In either case,
both purpose and knowledge can be expected to attract much evidentiary
attention in future criminal antitrust actions. The lower federal courts now
have the task of clarifying the degree of knowledge necessary to impose
liability.
E. Four Points of Procedure
Each of the remaining cases to be reviewed involved a specific question
of procedure. Two dealt with antitrust procedure and are characterized by
literalism-literal interpretation by the Court of the applicable legal stan-
dards. The other two dealt with class action procedure, which is quite
important in treble damage litigation. Both decisions tend to restrict the
use of the class action device by plaintiffs.
1. Pfizer: A Person is a Person
In Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 2 the Court split 5-3 over the
meaning of "person" in section 4 of the Clayton Act, which authorizes
treble damage suits by "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. . .. "221
The question before the Court was whether a foreign government is em-
braced by the word "person. '" The majority and minority of the Court
recognized that Congress did not directly address the question in enacting
the predecessor to section 4 in 1890.21 However, each side drew a different
conclusion as to the significance of the lack of congressional direction on
the issue. The majority reasoned that an exception to the general rule
permitting foreign governments to sue in American courts could not be
justified without clear legislative intent. The minority opined that the
scope of standing to sue under the antitrust laws should not be expanded
"without express congressional intent to do so." 1°
Permitting antitrust standing in a case of first impression, however,
does not necessarily expand the scope of standing. Such a case may simply
- 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
- 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
2 Several actions were brought against six manufacturers of pharmaceuticals for price
fixing and other alleged violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 434 U.S. at 309-10 &
nn. 1, 2 & 3.
us Id. at 312. The original treble damage provision was § 7 of the Sherman Act, which
was re-enacted as § 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
m 434 U.S. at 319. Justice Stewart wrote for the five-man majority.
21 Id. at 329. The Chief Justice wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Powell
and Rehnquist. Justice Powell filed a separate dissent. Justice Blackmun took no part in
consideration of the case.
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delineate the scope predefmed by statute. As the majority pointed out,
nothing in the legislative history of the Sherman Act demonstrated an
intention to narrow the "naturally broad and inclusive meaning" of the
phrase "any person." 31
The Court analyzed two characteristics of the governments seeking
standing that arguably could exclude them from the reach of section 4.
First, the respondents were foreign, not American consumers. The Court
noted, however, that foreign corporations are entitled to sue as "persons"
under certain sections of the Sherman and Clayton Acts."' The Court also
recognized that permitting foreign parties to sue for treble damages may
contribute to the protection of American businesses and consumers by
deterring anticompetitive conduct having both international and domestic
impact?3 Thus, the status of the respondents as foreigners was insufficient
to deny standing to sue. The second possible argument was that respon-
dents were sovereign governments. The Court observed, however, that in
its decision in Georgia v. Evansz a state government was included within
the scope of "any person." Since a foreign government may suffer to the
same extent as a state government victimized by antitrust violations, the
majority in Pfizer reasoned that a foreign government should be entitled
to the same remedy as the states.26 Therefore, the Court expressed concern
over the impact of standing on two antitrust goals: deterrence and compen-
sation.2 7 In light of the broad scope of antitrust remedies generally, the
Court was reluctant to allow a Sherman Act violator to escape liability
because of the fortuity that the victims were foreign customers.
In view of the Court's previous denial of standing of the United States
to sue for treble damages,3 9 affording standing to foreign countries seems
anomalous. Although section 4(a) of the Clayton Act 20 was added to mo-
dify the exclusion of the United States, that section specifically limits
recovery by the federal government to actual damages, plus costs. As
"I Id. at 312.
2 See § 8 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976); § 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §
12 (1976).
"3 434 U.S. at 314-15.
316 U.S. at 159 (1942).
Id. at 162-63.
434 U.S. at 318.
2 It should be noted that the Supreme Court has specifically excluded the United States
government from seeking treble damages as a "person" under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976). United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941). The Court's holding
in Cooper was based on legislative history and the recognition that the federal government,
unlike the states, can seek antitrust remedies such as injunctions, seizure of property, and
criminal prosecutions. Id. at 606-07; see 434 U.S. at 316-17.
2m The Court rejected the argument that it was interfering with foreign policy. 434 U.S.
at 319. The Department of State foresaw "no foreign policy problems" with permitting foreign
governments-to sue under § 4. Memorandum for United States, as amicus curiae, Appendix
A.
221 See note 237 supra.
2,0 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1976).
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Judge Ross noted in his concurrence in the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Pfizer, the time had come for Congress to address this matter directly. 4'
2. Greyhound: Literalism v. Equity
What is now section 5(i) of the Clayton Act"' "was enacted to ensure
that private litigants would have the benefit of prior Government antitrust
enforcement efforts."4 3 The section tolls the running of the statute of limi-
tations for private and state actions under the antitrust laws from the date
when "any civil or criminal [antitrust] proceeding is instituted by the
United States . . ." until one year after the conclusion of such a proceed-
ing.ul In Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 45 the Court consid-
ered whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of a petition
by the United States in an Interstate Commerce Commission proceeding.
The Ninth Circuit held that the literal wording of section 5(i) was not
controlling. Rather, the ICC intervention was treated as "the functional
equivalent" of direct action by the United States.2 1 The Supreme Court
reversed. Emphasizing the need for "certainty and predictability" 247 in
applying section 5(i), the Court adhered to the plain meaning of the stat-
ute.24 8 However, Mt. Hood argued that if statutory tolling was not avail-
able, then equitable tolling should have been. 49 The Court refrained from
examining this alternative theory,"' but the Chief Justice, concerned over
Greyhound's "egregious conduct,"' 1 invited the court of appeals on re-
-' 550 F.2d 396, 399-400 (8th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Ross, J., concurring); see text accom-
panying notes 294-304 infra.
242 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1976). This is a modification of what originally was § 5 of the
Clayton Act.
"I Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 334 (1978).
US 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1976) (emphasis added).
245 437 U.S. 322 (1978).
-5 555 F.2d 687, 700 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting from the opinion of the trial court).
'A 437 U.S. at 335.
2 Id. at 329 n.11. Mt. Hood had challenged certain Greyhound acquisitions in the 1940's
and 1950's which nevertheless were approved by the ICC. As the result of Greyhound's alleged
breach of representations before the ICC, Mt. Hood sought in 1964 to reopen the acquisition
proceedings. Id. at 326. After Mt. Hood filed its petition in October of that year, the govern-
ment filed a petition on December 14, asserting that it had "no way of knowing whether those
of Mt. Hood's allegations which Greyhound denies are true or false. ... Id. at 327. On
July 5, 1968, in the midst of settlement negotiations following an ICC evidentiary hearing,
Mt. Hood filed a federal antitrust action. Id. at 328. The jury found, in 1973, that Greyhound
had fraudulently concealed its antitrust violations from 1953 until July 4, 1964, but that Mt.
Hood knew or should have known of the violations by December 14, 1960. Thus, tolling by
virtue of the government's December, 1964, petition would have served to link the four-year
limitations period preceding July 5, 1968, with the prior period to December 14, 1960, which
in turn would have been linked by fraudulent concealment to a period beginning on January
1, 1953. Id. at 329. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision, damages could not relate to
the time prior to July 5, 1964.
US Respondent's Brief at 22-32.
437 U.S. at 337 n.21.
"' Id. at 337-38 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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mand to examine the equitable tolling doctrine under "traditional equita-
ble principles."' z
3. Livesay and Sanders: Confronting the Realities of Class Actions
Class actions typically are expensive, protracted litigation, the out-
come of which is often dictated by the resolution of issues unrelated to
the merit of the plaintiffs' underlying claims. Decisions such as those per-
taining to class certification and allocation of expenses, if resolved in favor
of defendants, can bring possibly meritorious claims to an early demise.
On the other hand, if such decisions favor plaintiffs, groundless claims can
impose staggering burdens on defendants. Class actions that assert in con-
clusory fashion claims of antitrust conspiracy founded on parallel business
behavior can be particularly onerous from a defendant's standpoint. Com-
plaints barely sufficient to survive motions to dismiss under Rule 12 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can lead to disruptive discovery that
forces businesses (especially small firms) to settle simply because they
cannot afford the expense of litigation-no matter how strong their defen-
ses. Such suits, although brought under antitrust laws, in fact distort the
operations of antitrust, which encourages competition and frequently af-
fords special solicitude to the small entrepreneur. As a leading antitrust
commentator has observed, "[m]assive class actions constitute a net lia-
bility for antitrust, for federal courts, and for society generally."
Two 1978 Supreme Court class action decisions, although not involving
the antitrust laws, should be welcomed by antitrust defendants. In Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay,n4 the Court resolved a conflict among the circuits"'
by holding that a denial of class certification under Rule 23 is not a "final
decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 129126 and, therefore, not
independently appealable as a matter of right.27 Although several circuits
had held such denials appealable if likely to sound the "death knell" of
the action-the end of the litigation because it would be economically
unfeasible to proceed without certification-Justice Stevens, for a unani-
mous Court, sounded a death knell for the "death knell" doctrine itself.
22 Id. at 339. The district court has since held that equitable tolling applies. Mt. Hood
Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 1979-1 TRAE CAS. 62,446 (D. Ore. 1979).
211 Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovation in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1971). The need
for reform is widely recognized, and a reform bill (S. 3475) introduced in 1978 is expected to
undergo revisions and receive serious attention from the 96th Congress. A succinct discussion
of the bill was provided by Assistant Attorney General Meador, in charge of the Justice
Department's Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, in 65 A.B.A.J. 48
(Jan. 1978). Mr. Meador asserts that the measure "is not a plaintiffs', defendants', or judges'
bill." Id. at 55.
2" 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
21 See id. at 465 n.2.
= 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides circuit courts with jurisdiction over appeals "from
all final decisions of the district courts .. except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court."
2 437 U.S. at 467.
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The Court stated that a decision to deny or grant a motion for class certifi-
cation is "inherently tentative."' 8 Courts applying the death knell doc-
trine looked not to the finality of an order but to the prospective impact
the order would have on an individual plaintiff.
In the other decision, Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 21 the Court
examined the question of allocation of the cost of preparing a list of class
members and their addresses to be used in distributing the requisite notice
of the action. Again the Court was unanimous. The Court held that Rule
23(d), while authorizing district courts to direct defendants to help compile
such a list, permits allocating the cost of doing so to defendants only if the
expense of the task performed by them is "insubstantial. 2 0 In Sanders,
preparing an accurate list would have required the defendant's stock trans-
fer agent to sort papers manually, keypunch from 150,000 to 300,000 com-
puter cards, and create new computer programs. " The estimated cost of
completing the list was $16,000.2 2
The Court first resolved a split of authority on whether Rule 23(d) or
the discovery rules empower district courts to enlist the aid of defendants
in identifying class members. The Court held that if the information was
sought only for the purpose of compiling the class member list, the aid
may be ordered only under Rule 23(d). The Court explained that a district
court in its discretion may order a defendant to perform a task necessary
to the notice procedure if the defendant can perform the task "with less
difficulty or expense than could the representative plaintiff.12  Although
the district court may allocate the cost of performing the task, the Su-
preme Court cautioned "that courts must not stray too far from the princi-
ple underlying Eisen IV24 that the representative plaintiff should bear all
costs relating to the sending of notice because it is he who seeks to main-
tain the suit as a class action. ' 2 Thus, the burden should be shifted only
if "insubstantial," such as in cases when the cost is insubstantial or the
task would have been performed in any event by the defendant in the or-
dinary course of business.2 6 In Sanders, the district court had abused its
discretion in requiring defendants to pay'the "relatively modest" sum of
$16,000.267 Although recognizing that the assets of the Fund exceeded $500
million, the Supreme Court explained, "In the context of a lawsuit in
which the defendants deny all liability, the imposition on them of a thresh-
211 Id. at 469 n.11.
-" 437 U.S. 340 (1978).
1B* Id. at 359.
"' Id. at 345.
n2 Id.
21 Id. at 356.
' Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). In Sanders, the Court confined its
holding in Eisen IV to a requirement that plaintiffs must pay the cost of class action notice
when they prepare and mail notice themselves. 437 U.S. af 350.
21 437 U.S. at 359.
29 Id.
21 Id. at 361.
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old expense of $16,000 to enable the plaintiffs to identify their own class
hardly can be viewed as an insubstantial burden." '
II. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: AT THE AGENCIES AND ON THE Huir
A. Premerger Notification: Regulatory Antitrust
The most significant event in antitrust enforcement in 1978 was the
issuance of the long-awaited premerger notification rules of the Federal
Trade Commission,2  implementing Title II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.2 ° Some two years in the making,21
the rules were finally published in the Federal Register on July 31, 1978. 2
Perhaps it was to be expected, in light of their lengthy period of gestation,
that publication of the rules would contain numerous typographical errors
and omission. The appended notification and report form was republished
on August 4,23 and the rules finally took effect on September 5, 1978.21
Congress passed Title II to provide statutory clout for the FTC's pro-
gram of premerger notification, which had been in existence since 1969.25
Title I, which is codified as new section 7A to the Clayton Act, 2 has
furnished the government's antitrust agencies with an important new
means of enforcing section 7, which was designed to prevent restraints of
trade in their incipiency.17 The new requirements signify the beginning of
a Id. at 362.
" 43 Fed. Reg. 33,357 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. §§ 801.1-803.90).
21 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1390 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976)).
21 The Antitrust Improvements Act was signed into law on September 30, 1976. The
premerger notification provisions (Title II) were to take effect on February 27, 1977. On
December 20, 1976, proposed rules were published in the Federal Register. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,488
(1976). On January 27, 1977, the FTC issued a transitional rule suspending operation of Title
II until final rules were promulgated. 42 Fed. Reg. 6,365-66 (1977). The transitional rule was
corrected, 42 Fed. Reg. 63,883 (1977), and later amended, 43 Fed. Reg. 27,516 (1978). Revised
proposed rules were published for comment on August 1, 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,040 (1977).
Comments each time were extensive. One hundred thirty-three were received initially, and
116 were received in response to the revised proposal.
21 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537 (1978).
- 43 Fed. Reg. 34,443 (1978).
21 Most, but not all, of the typographical errors were corrected on August 15, 1978. 43
Fed. Reg. 36,053 (1978).
211 Fed. Reg. Doc. 69-5617, May 9, 1969, superseded by 39 Fed. Reg. 7,951 (1972),
supplemented by 38 Fed. Reg. 5,513 (1973), superseded by 39 Fed. Reg. 35,717 (1974). The
old rules were of limited scope, nearly impossible to enforce, and lacked effective sanctions
for persons failing to comply. Nevertheless, the old rules, as further amended, remain in effect
for those who fail to file under the new rules in spite of a requirement to do so unless exempt.
43 Fed. Reg. 57,656-57 (1978). Presumably, the old rules will provide the FTC some leverage
in the event of legal challenge to any of the new rules.
21 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976).
21 16A voN KALINOWSKI, ANTrrRUST LAwS AND TRADE REGULATION § 15.02 [1] at 15-8
(1978). Section 7 generally prohibits the acquisition by one corporation of another's stock or
assets "where in any line of commerce in any section of the -country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
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a new era of section 7 enforcement, one with "bite" as well as "bark," ' n
and thus one resembling the new era of Sherman Act enforcement brought
about by the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974.
Ostensibly, the new requirements make no substantive changes in the
antitrust laws. Their official appellation sounds innocuous: "Reporting
and Waiting Period Requirements.""2 ' The statute, as implemented by the
rules, requires companies of a certain minimal size, in terms of assets or
sales,2' to report to the FTC and to the Department of Justice prior to
consummating acquisitions that exceed specified dimensions., 2 The re-
quirements are intended to provide for preclosing review of mergers by
federal agencies. Thirty days after agency notification, or 15 days in the
case of cash tender offers, the companies may close the transaction without
affirmative agency approval.2' 3
The new rules are both broad and complex, in contrast to the decep-
tively simple contents of the statute. The rules span some fifteen pages of
the Federal Register, and are accompanied by the appended reporting form
and an 86-page commentary. Not only do the rules cover conventional
purchases of stock or assets, but they also encompass mergers, 2 4 consolida-
"8 Section 7A(g)(1) creates up to a $10,000 civil penalty for each day any person, includ-
ing any officer, director, or partner, fails to comply with the requirements. 15 U.S.C. §
18a(g)(1) (1976).
2" Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (codified at scattered statutes in U.S.C. titles 15,
47, and 49 (1976)).
10 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450 (1978).
"' Firms must report if one party to an acquisition of voting securities or assets has net
sales or total assets of at least $100 million and the other has net sales or total assets of at
least $10 million, regardless of which company is acquiring the other, unless the company to
be acquired is not engaged in manufacturing and the $100 million size threshold is not met
by it, in which case the acquired company must have assets of at least $10 million. See 15
U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2) (1976).
2 The size-of-transaction thresholds, established by Section 7A(a)(3) 15 U.S.C. §
18a(a)(3) (1976), coupled with the minimum dollar value rule, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,544-45 (1978)
(to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 802.20) produce the following test- An acquisition of stock is
reportable if as a result of the acquisition the "acquiring person" would hold at least 50% of
the outstanding voting securities of an issuer which, together with all entities it controls, has
annual net sales or total assets of $10 million or more, or would hold more than $15 million
worth of the voting securities of the "acquired person." An acquisition of assets is reportable
if as a result of the acquisition the "acquiring person" would hold at least 15% and more than
$10 million worth of the assets of the "acquired person" or would hold more than $15 million
worth of assets, regardless of the percentage. If both stock and assets are to be acquired, the
transaction is reportable if as a result of the acquisition the "acquiring person" would hold
"an aggregate total amount of the voting securities and assets of the acquired person in excess
of $15,000,000." 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(3) (1976). The term "person," is critical, having been used
36 times in the statute. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,455 (1978). The term is defined by Rule 801.1(a)(1)
to include the "ultimate parent entity" and "all entities" controlled directly or indirectly by
the parent. Id. at 33,538. The terms "entity" and "ultimate parent entity" are defined by
Rule 801(a)(2) and (3). Id. The terms "acquiring person" and "acquired person" are defined
in Rule 801.2. Id. at 539.
2" See § 7A(a), (b); 43 Fed. Reg. 33,549-50 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 803.10).
2 In spite of the nomenclature "premerger notification," statutory mergers as a form of
acquisition are inadequately treated in the rules. Depending on their structure, they could
be deemed acquisitions of either assets or securities. The FTC, in keeping with the pdrposes
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tions, tender offers," exchange offers, open market purchases, and the
formation of corporate joint ventures. The rules even reach secondary ac-
quisitions 6 and natural persons.2 7 In short, the rules affect any form of
significant acquisition of stock or assets.m The complexity of the rules
stems from the multiplicity of forms that such acquisitions may take and
from the difficulties inherent in premerger analysis, which by necessity is
speculative.
The rules also require that premerger notification be accompanied by
relevant documents, including copies of SEC filings and studies "prepared
by or for any officer(s) or director(s) . . for the purpose of evaluating or
analyzing the acquisition with respect to market shares, competition, com-
petitors, markets [and] potential for sales growth or expansion . ... "21
The statute provides for confidential treatment of such studies and other
information submitted, but it remains to be seen how much comfort the
assurance of confidentiality affords in light of the vague statutory excep-
tion for material deemed "relevant to any administrative or judicial action
or proceeding."o
Although procedural in nature, the new requirements may in certain
circumstances have substantive impact on proposed acquisitions. The gov-
ernment, by requesting additional information, can extend the waiting
period an additional 20 days (10 days for cash tender offers) beyond the
time of receipt of the additional information, and further extensions may
be granted by a court.2 1' Moreover, premerger filings may trigger the use
of the rules, is considering all mergers, no matter how they are structured, to be acquisitions
of securities. Cf. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 334-49 (1963)
(Supreme Court takes similar view).
2u Tender offers are specifically addressed by the statute, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b) (1976), as
well as by the rules. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,549 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 803.10). The
main impact of the new requirements on tender offers is when they are hostile, for the "white
knight" must report and wait just as the "raider" does. But the "raider" normally has a head
start.
2u 43 Fed. Reg. 33,539-40 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.4). Secondary acquisi-
tions are indirect acquisitions of voting securities held by an acquired person that does not
control the issuer of the securities (that is, hold 50% or more of the outstanding voting
securities). The notification requirements are applicable to secondary acquisitions in the
same manner as they are applicable to primary acquisitions.
2" 43 Fed. Reg. 33,537 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(a)(2)). A natural person
is an "entity" that can "control" another corporation by holding 50% or more of its outstand-
ing voting securities. Thus, the natural person can be part of the same "person" as the
corporation. Since the natural person cannot be "controlled" under the rules, such a person
can only be a stockholder who is an "ultimate parent entity." See id. at 33,537-38 (to be
codified in 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(a), (b)).
21 There are exemptions, including, for example, good or realty transferred in the ordi-
nary course of business and acquisitions of voting securities solely for the purpose of invest-
ment if as a result of the acquisition the acquiring person would not hold more than 10% of
the issuer's outstanding voting securities. Section 7A(c)(1), (9), 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(1), (9),
(1976); see Fed. Reg. 33,544, 33,548 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 802.1, 802.71).
n' 43 Fed. Reg. 33,555 (1978) (Item 4(c) of the Notification and Report Form).
"0 Section 7A(h), 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h) (1976).
"I Section 7A(e)(5); 43 Fed. Reg, 33,551 (1978) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 802.20(c)).
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of other governmental investigatory tools, such as civil investigative de-
mands. By compelling the government to examine all major acquisitions
in advance, Title II of the Antitrust Improvements Act has created a type
of regulatory antitrust, necessitating tacit governmental approval before
companies may proceed with a major acquisition. The government, as a
result of its power to delay an acquisition, in effect, becomes a party to the
acquisition. Further, by merely expressing concern over the antitrust con-
sequences of an acquisition through a request for additional information,
the government's interference with the delicate timing of the acquisition
negotiations can affect their outcome. At times, the authority to delay a
transaction is tantamount to the power of halting the acquisition alto-
gether. 12
The new requirements should make section 7 a more effective means
of insuring competition since now section 7 is more likely to be used pro-
spectively against potentially anticompetitive acquisitions, rather than
merely as a club to be wielded after the fact. Courts naturally have been
reluctant to unscramble consummated business combinations; however,
the government has had no effective means for assuring timely interven-
tion. The new requirements are designed to provide those means. If the
government fails to take advantage of the new requirements, it should
expect increasing hostility from courts asked to dissolve combinations that
might have been prevented in the first place.293
B. Developments in the Congress and the Justice Department
1. Deregulation and Attempted Reversals
Congressional enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978294 was
consistent with the narrowing of antitrust immunities by the Supreme
Court. This landmark measure includes "sunset" amendments to the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 195825 that will remove authority of the Civil Aeronau-
212 The government clearly recognizes the potential impact. For example, last fall at a
seminar on the new requirements, Roger Dennis, Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, indicated that the Division would "make the most serious efforts
to ensure that premerger notification remains only a notification program. We realize that
acquisition transactions are often fragile. Initial requests which are impossible to complete
and requests for additional information which cause undue delay can stop a merger just as
effectively as an injunction." Remarks by Roger Dennis, New York Law Journal seminar, in
New York City, at 3 (October 16, 1978). As of December 21, 1978, reports had been filed for
292 transactions; 26 transactions had prompted 46 requests for additional information. The
Antitrust Division had filed two motions for preliminary injunctions as a result of information
received pursuant to premerger notification. FTC, Second Annual Report to Congress Pur-
suant to Section 201 of the Hart-Scott-Rudino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976. (July 26,
1978).
In spite of the statute's admonition that governmental action or inaction in response
to premerger notification shall not bar a later challenge of an acquisition, it seems inevitable
that the government's initial response will, as a practical matter, impact upon later proceed-
ings begun by the government.
n' Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq.).
215 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976)). .
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tics Board over airline routes by the end of 1981 and over fares as of the
end of 1982. Deregulation of the airline industry was prompted by concern
over the dramatic cost of regulation by the CAB 96 and the realization that
regulation was antithetical to the antitrust principle of free and unfettered
competition. Because the inefficiencies of regulation are not peculiar to the
airlines industry, the current administration also has set its sights on dis-
carding regulation of the trucking and rail industries.
Before Congress voted to restore competition in the airlines industry,
it had started down a collision course with the Court in connection with
antitrust enforcement. The majority opinion in Illinois Brick297 had hardly
been released before bills were introduced to overturn the Court's holding
that only direct purchasers of price-fixed products can suffer antitrust
"injury" within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act.99 Hearings
held in 1977 and again in 1978 illustrated the complexities of issues that
are now before the 96th Congress.nY
Whether indirect purchasers should be afforded an opportunity to
prove the "pass-on" of illegal overcharges paid by direct purchasers is
open to question. The question is complicated by the inevitable considera-
tion by Congress of whether Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.3® should also be reversed to permit defendants to use the "pass-on"
theory by arguing that plaintiffs had passed on any overcharges to their
customers and thus had not suffered antitrust injury. Congress also was
inclined to challenge Pfizer,3"' another section 4 decision, but one which
raised different issues. Congressional deliberation, however, proved fruit-
less.3
02
258 The cost of regulation of the airlines industry by the CAB has been estimated at $1.8
billion annually. Statement of Joe Sims, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division at 45, 56, before the National Commission for Review of Antitrust Laws (July 26,
1978).
2 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
211 See text accompanying notes 225-41 supra. The Court in Illinois Brick, however, did
list several exceptions to its holding. See 431 U.S. at 732-n.12, 736 n.16.
2' See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1874 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
= 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
31 See text accompanying notes 225-41 supra. A fourth decision which was related to the
debate, United Siates v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941), was later reversed by Congress
to allow single damage actions by the United States under section 4. See text accompanying
notes 240-41 supra.
302 Pfizer was decided in January, 1978, in the midst of the debate over Illinois Brick.
Provisions to reverse Pfizer were added without hearings to pending Illinois Brick measures.
H.R. 11942 was reported by the Committee on the Judiciary in July and would have reversed
Illinois Brick, Hanover Shoe, and Pfizer. H.R. REP. No. 95-1397, pt. I, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1978). The bill was then referred to the Committee on International Relations for considera-
tion of section 3, which would have excluded foreign governments from the scope of the term
"person" as used in section 4 of the Clayton Act. -This committee reported the bill but
expressed its "deep concern" over the "serious foreign policy implications" of section 3 and
recommended that it be stricken. Id. pt. II at 1. The bill never reached the floor for a vote.
S. 1874, reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. 95-934, would also
have modified all three decisions. The threat of filibuster through hundreds of contemplated
amendments prevented the measure from reaching the Senate floor.
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Although there is an amalgam of difficult policy issues that deserve
congressional scrutiny," 3 the emotional overtones of debate and the mis-
leading tenor of arguments made by proponents of legislation are trouble-
some. Concern over proposed legislation has been expressed by both sides
of the antitrust bar. Yet certain politicians, influenced by federal and state
antitrust law enforcement officials and their staffs, seek legislation pur-
portedly in the interest of "fairness" to the "consumer" without giving
sufficient regard to the array of criticism of the proposed legislation and
to the realities of antitrust litigation."'
2. Justice's Shared Monopoly Theory
Since the appointment of John H. Shenefield as Assistant Attorney
General of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, businessmen have
become increasingly concerned over possible antitrust enforcement efforts,
particularly those aimed at concentrated industries. The news media has
contributed to the concern of business, for in the past few years antitrust
10 The basic issues are whether any or all of the three Supreme Court decisions should
be overturned, whether proposals to overturn more than one of the decisions should be
introduced separately or as one bill, and the precise manner in which the decisions would be
overturned. Other matters for consideration are: whether indirect purchasers (and foreign
governments) should be limited to actual instead of treble damages; whether there should
be "fluid recovery" of aggregate damages without individual proof of the fact or amount of
injury, as provided by H.R. 11942; how to deal with the possibility of inconsistent or duplica-
tive judgments; and what impact the Illinois Brick legislation would have on the judicial
system. Also important is whether legislation should be retroactive until June 9, 1977, the
date of the Illinois Brick decision and whether relief for indirect purchasers should be limited
to amounts recoverable through parens patriae suits by state attorneys general and through
suits by state and local governments suing in their commercial capacities.
I" The Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary provides several instances in
which the committee members failed to focus on the proper antitrust issues. Consider the
discussion of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, which receives emphasis in the
report. The Report addresses only the Sherman Act as originally drafted and not the form in
which it was passed. The Senate Report contains passages of the debate in 1890 concerning
the original draft of the Sherman Act, which, taken out of context, make it appear that those
who passed the Act clearly favored standing for all consumers, whether or not they are direct
purchasers. However, these passages concern statutory proposals that would have afforded
standing to any person "injured or damnified" as a result of violations that included arrange-
ments that "tend to advance the cost to the consumer of any such articles [of commerce]."
(emphasis added). The quoted language failed to survive when the bill was reported from the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
Although Congress in 1890 appears to have intended, among other purposes, to benefit
consumers through passage of the Sherman Act, the question at hand is how best to enforce
the Act and thereby serve the purposes intended. It does not necessarily follow that any
consumer of a price-fixed product, regardless of where he stands in the chain of distribution,
should be permitted to launch a treble damage action. Any damages suffered by an indirect
purchaser from the pass-on of overcharges is likely to be so small that it can only be recouped
through a class action. Given the difficulties with class actions, which often reward only
counsel for plaintiffs, it is questionable whether expensive, protracted litigation should be
permitted over the extent, if any, to which pass-on has taken place if there are other, effective
means of deterring price-fixing.
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has gained a higher media profile than has been customary.305 One theory
on which attention has been focused is that of "shared monopoly," a term
that has aroused great concern, but which is subject to considerable misun.
derstanding. A confidential Justice Department memorandum prepared
last summer, which was leaked to the public, " ' shed some light on the
theory. The first of two planned memoranda, this memorandum focused
on governmental challenges to "shared monopoly" under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The forthcoming memorandum will examine challenges
under section 2.
Although "shared monopoly" is a novel term, the term serves only to
confuse an inherently complex inquiry. Shared monopoly relates to cir-
cumstances in concentrated industries in which firms, through joint be-
havior, act as a monopolist by increasing prices and reducing output.
Thus, the firms "share" a monopoly only through concerted action. In
effect, within the context of the section 1 approach set forth in the memo-
randum, shared monopoly is nothing more than a conventional Sherman
Act indirect price-fixing conspiracy, the existence of which is inferred from
interdependent parallel conduct. Such conduct consists of "concerted
adoption by firms in a concentrated industry of mechanisms that facilitate
the achievement of an industry pricing or output consensus and police
deviations from it."' Thus, information exchanges, product standardiza-
tion, price books, and the like may serve as vehicles for illegal price fixing.
This activity, however, is actionable without formulation of any new anti-
trust lexicon. Although numerous Justice Department investigations are
underway regarding shared monopoly, no action has been taken against
any particular industry. Some action is expected in 1979.
C. NCRALP
The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Proce-
dures (NCRALP) was established by Executive Order' " and served
throughout the latter half of 1978. NCRALP held its final meeting on
January 16, 1979, "and issued its report on January 22.311 In its report
NCRALP made recommendations for congressional action to expidite de-
cisions in complex antitrust litigation, provide for more effective remedies,
and eliminate various antitrust immunities.
3" For predictions of more forceful enforcement of the antitrust laws by the Justice
Department after Shenefield's appointment, see Bus. WEEK, Sept. 19, 1977, at 43; FORBES,
Aug. 15, 1977, at 25; NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 1977, at 66.
3" This memorandum was released by Mark J. Green, Director of Congress Watch, a
public interest lobbying group. ANTITRUST & TADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 874, at A-7, F-1 to
-6 (July 27, 1978).
31 Id. at F-I.
3 Exec. Order No. 12,022, 3 C.F.R. 155 (1978), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,052,
43 Fed. Reg. 15,133 (1978). The amendment expanded the size of the Commission from 15 to
22 members. The additional seven members were not appointed until June 21, 1978, the date
of the Commission's first meeting.
3" REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATI'RNEY GENERAL OF THE NAT'L COMM. FOR THE
REVIEW OF ANTITrusT LAws AND PRocEDUREs (Jan. 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
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Cynics will contend that dust already coats this report. Although noth-
ing startling was revealed by the Commission, the report may at least serve
as an additional impetus toward better management of "big" cases and
toward fewer immunities, and thus toward less regulation and more com-
petition. Although a detailed analysis of NCRALP's work must await an-
other article, a few words are in order in light of previous discussion in this
survey.
Not surprisingly, in light of the Supreme Court's gradual tightening of
the state action immunity, the National Commission declined to interfere
with the case-by-case shaping of "state action." Certain statutory exemp-
tions, however, should be targets of legislation, according to the Commis-
sion, and all immunities should be reexamined by Congress. Quoting Com-
missioner Kahn, the report succinctly characterized economic regulation
(price and entry controls) as consisting largely of "saying 'no.' "310
NCRALP recognized that immunities and regulation are concomitants in
conflict with competition. Immunities and regulation often result in in-
ceased cost and decreased efficiency. Thus, the Commission called for
repeal of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act,31' rapid deregulation of the trucking
industry, and substantial deregulation of the rail industry. In addition, the
Commission advised that the McCarran-Ferguson Act 312 be replaced by
"narrowly drawn legislation" that authorizes "essential collective activi-
ties.3 13 The report also included recommendations concerning exemptions
in agriculture, ocean shipping, and export associations.314
The Commission directed its attention to the novel substantive theory
of "no-conduct monopolization, '31 5 also referred to as "no fault" monop-
oly, 31 and called for congressional hearings on the subject. Chief apostles
of the theory before the Commission were Professor Flynn of the University
of Utah, Professors Areeda and Turner of Harvard, and Alfred Dougherty,
Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition. Although the three views
differed in some respects,"7 each would permit equity actions to be brought
by the government against defendants solely on the basis of monopoly
power, without regard to conduct. The no fault monopoly theory advocates
overturning the familiar Grinnell standard of unlawful monopolization
310 Id. at 178 (quoting testimony of Alfred K. Kahn, then Chairman, Civil Aeronautics
Board).
"I The Reed-Bulwinkle Act exempts collective ratemaking in the trucking and rail in-
dustries. Pub. L. No. 80-662, 62 Stat. 472 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1976)); see REPORT,
supra note 309, at 197-223.
312 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
113 See REPORT, supra note 309, at 225.
", Id. at 253-306.
Id. at 151.
3,1 See FTC: WATCH, Dec. 1, 1978, at 33.
3,1 Dougherty, for example, would permit action only against monopoly power persisiting
for at least 5 years in a relevant market where total sales exceeded $500 million; structural
relief would be permitted only if there were no "substantial loss of efficiencies of scale."
Statement of Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr. before the Nat'l Comm. for the Review of Antitrust
Laws and Procedures, Appendix A (Oct. 17, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Dougherty State-
ment]. See generally REPORT, supra note 309, at 151-63.
[Vol. XXXVI
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
which requires monopoly power coupled with the "willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinquished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent."318 Assuming such a change in the law would expedite litigation
under section 2 of the Sherman Act,319 to amend section 2 for that reason
alone would promote form over substance. In establishing antitrust policy,
Congress should not assume that "bigness" is bad,30 but instead should
demand proof. Moreover, Congress should be reluctant to interfere with an
industry solely because of the industry's structure. Fragmentation of large
corporations without regard to their conduct would constitute interference
with market operations and thus contradict the theme of the Commission's
report, which advocates more competition and less regulation.
III. CONCLUSION
In the past year, antitrust developments consisted generally of steady
acceleration toward increased competition, fueled by decisions reached by
all three branches of the federal government. The Supreme Court narrowed
immunities, rejected an asserted defense to government enforcement, and
broadened standing for private enforcement. Congress deregulated the air-
line industry, and an executive commission recommended deregulation of
other transportation industries, and further narrowing of immunities. Pre-
merger notification was reenforced through administrative rulemaking, the
purpose of which was to foster more effective means for assuring that
acquisitions are not anticompetitive.
There is no reason to doubt that efforts to increase competition will
continue. Competition is now recognized as an important weapon in the
fight against inflation, a leading domestic problem.2 ' As the President has
predicted, "We will redouble our efforts to put competition back into the
American free enterprise system." 3
31 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). Monopoly power is
"the power to control market prices or exclude competition." Id. at 571 (quoting United
States v. du Pont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
31 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2 makes it unlawful for any person to "monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopol-
ize any part of trade or commerce. . . ." See REPORT, supra note 309, at 358-62 (separate
views of Commissioner Hatch, questioning whether change in section 2 would expedite litiga-
tion).
21 Dougherty insists there is no controversy over "the undesirability of substantial, per-
sistent monopoly powers." Yet he would permit a defense based on prospective "substantial
loss of efficiencies of scale." Dougherty Statement, supra note 317, at 4, 11-13.
ul See Address by President Carter on October 24, 1978, 14 WEEKLY COMP. oF PRES. DoC.
1839, 1842 (Oct. 30, 1978).
w Id.
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